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I. INTRODUCTION
Pressured by directives from the Obama Department of
Education (DOE), colleges and universities across the country
hastily revamped their processes of adjudicating sexual assault,
making it easier to bring, and prove, charges of sexual misconduct
on campus.1 These changes have generated substantial concern on
behalf of accused students. Commentators from both sides of the
political spectrum have objected, arguing that the new college
misconduct codes are dismissive of the rights of respondents.2 In the
past few years, respondents found liable for sexual misconduct under
the new codes have sued in court, claiming violations of contract or
due process. In a number of recent cases, the courts have upheld
those claims.3
1. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Biden and Obama Rewrite the Rulebook on
College
Sexual
Assaults,
WASH.
POST
(July
3,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-and-obama-rewrite-the-rulebook-oncollege-sexual-assaults/2016/07/03/0773302e-3654-11e6-a254-2b336e293a3c_story.
html?utm_term=.d8976f8e194c.
2. See, e.g., The Trump Administration’s Approach to Rape on Campus Is
Welcome, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/unitedstates/21728966-barack-obamas-government-put-undue-pressure-colleges-secureconvictions-return; see also KC JOHNSON & STUART TAYLOR JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE
FRENZY: THE ATTACK ON DUE PROCESS AT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES 89 (2017);
LAURA KIPNIS, UNWANTED ADVANCES: SEXUAL PARANOIA COMES TO CAMPUS 16
(2017). See generally Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 881 (2016) (discussing the government’s growing interest in the sexual lives
of college students); Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX
Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103 (2015) (discussing how accused students are
subject to low standards of proof and possible hearsay); Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization
and State Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?, 96 TEX.
L. REV. 15 (2017) (discussing the government’s exertion of pressure on universities to
enforce sexual misconduct and whether this violates Due Process).
3. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. B271834, 2018 WL 6499696, at *1–2
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018) (finding that accused USC student, who had been found
liable for very serious sexual misconduct and expelled as a result, had been denied a
fair hearing by the university, where the adjudicator in the case had failed to
personally assess the credibility of three key witnesses; the respondent had not been
allowed to submit questions for the adjudicator to ask the complainant; and the
adjudicator had failed to conduct a fair and thorough investigation as promised in
the university’s procedures); Doe v. Claremont McKenna Coll., 25 Cal. App. 5th 1055,
1057–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (finding that accused Claremont McKenna student,
who had been found liable and suspended for sexual misconduct, had been denied a
fair hearing by the college where the student faced serious consequences if found
responsible; the case turned on credibility assessments of the complainant and
respondent; and the college had failed to require complainant to appear and to
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Now, the Department of Education (under Secretary Betsy
DeVos) has responded to those concerns by proposing new Title IX
regulations that would substantially amend the Obama-era guidance
in the name of fairness and due process.4 Subject to review and
approval following the notice and comment process of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act,5 the proposed reforms address a
number of issues related to sexual misconduct on campus. Those
issues include complainants’ and respondents’ constitutional rights
in this context, definitions of sexual harassment under Title IX, the
availability of remedies upon a finding of responsibility, and
institutional obligations as to staffing, notice, and dissemination of
relevant policies.6 With respect to the investigation and adjudication
of sexual harassment complaints in particular, the proposed
regulation would require school-“recipients” (recipients of federal
aid, the institutions covered under the provisions of Title IX) to:
• Narrow the definition of student-on-student sexual
harassment under Title IX to include sexual assault or
“[u]nwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a
person equal access to the recipient’s [school’s] education
program or activity.”7 (Previous DOE guidance had defined
Title IX sex harassment more broadly as “unwelcome conduct
of a sexual nature.”)8

answer questions from the adjudicator); Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal.
App. 5th 44, 46 (Ct. App. 2018) (finding that accused student, who had been
suspended for two years after being found liable for sexual misconduct under the
campus code of the University of California Santa Barbara, had been denied “even a
semblance of due process” where the respondent “was denied access to critical
evidence; denied the opportunity to adequately cross-examine witnesses; and denied
the opportunity to present evidence in his defense”).
4. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
On November 29, 2018, the Department of Education released its proposed Title IX
regulations. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462 (proposed Nov.
29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) [hereinafter DOE Proposed Rule].
5. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
6. DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 5.
7. Id. at 18.
8. RUSSLYNN ALI, ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 4,
2011)
[hereinafter
DEAR
COLLEAGUE
LETTER], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.
(a
significant guidance document regarding Title IX interpretation).
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• Hold a live hearing to adjudicate formal complaints. At
this hearing, recipients must allow the parties’ “advisor of
choice”
to
cross-examine
witnesses—including
the
complainant and respondent.9 (Obama-era DOE guidance did
not require a live hearing or the opportunity for crossexamination.)10
• Structurally separate the investigative, adjudicative, and
coordinating functions by forbidding schools from allowing
their Title IX coordinators to act as the claim investigator or
decision-maker.11 (Prior guidance did not require such
separation; for example, it allowed a school’s Title IX
coordinator to also act as investigator and decision-maker.)12
• Apply the correct standard of proof—either the
preponderance of the evidence standard or clear and
convincing evidence standard. The new guidance forbids the
use of the preponderance standard in sexual harassment
cases unless the school (1) also uses that standard to
adjudicate misconduct in areas other than sexual harassment
but which carry the same maximum penalty, and (2) uses
that same standard of evidence in cases involving complaints
against employees of the recipient, including faculty.13
(Previous guidance required schools to use the preponderance
standard.)14
• Treat both complainants and respondents “equitably.”
Equitable treatment would mean that, in cases involving a
formal complaint where a respondent is found liable,
recipients must offer complainants remedies “designed to
restore or preserve access to the recipient’s educational
program or activity”; and recipients must offer respondents
due process protections before imposing any disciplinary
sanctions.15

9. DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 52.
10. See generally DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8.
11. DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 63–64.
12. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 29, 2014) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
13. DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 62.
14. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8, at 11.
15. DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 135.
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• Evaluate evidence objectively, impartially, and without
any bias based on a party’s status as complainant or
respondent.16
• Ensure that college or university personnel who
investigate or adjudicate such complaints are properly
trained using materials which “promote impartial
investigations and adjudications of sexual harassment.”17
• Apply a presumption of non-responsibility in favor of
respondents prior to the conclusion of adjudication.18
• Bear the burden of proof and of producing sufficient
evidence, and ensure that those burdens do not fall upon
either the complainant or the respondent.19
• Give appropriate notice of the complaint and of relevant
procedures, and grant the parties equal access to relevant
evidence uncovered during the recipient’s investigation of the
complaint.20
The proposed rule strikes a familiar balance, seeking to respect
allegations of sexual misconduct while also protecting the rights of
the accused.21 But the conversation about sexual harassment on

16. Id. at 135–36.
17. Id. at 136.
18. Id. at 41.
19. Id. at 46.
20. Id. at 48.
21. See, e.g., Betsy DeVos, Betsy DeVos: It’s Time We Balance the Scales of
Justice In Our Schools, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2018),https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/betsy-devos-its-time-we-balance-the-scales-of-justice-in
-our-schools/2018/11/20/8dc59348-ecd6-11e8-9236-bb94154151d2_story.
html?utm_term=.21adb8794303 (“Our proposed framework supports survivors while
safeguarding due process, helping make Title IX protections against sex
discrimination a reality for all students. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how
people can object to procedures premised on the foundational concept of due process,
or how anybody could have confidence in a system that lacks such protections.”);
Susan Kruth, New Proposed Title IX Regulations Feature Essential Safeguards for
Free Speech and Due Process On Campus, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC.
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.thefire.org/new-proposed-title-ix-regulations-featureessential-safeguards-for-free-speech-and-due-process-on-campus/ (DOE’s new rules,
“if finalized, would help ensure [that schools] afford fair hearings to students accused
of sexual misconduct while taking seriously all accusations of such misconduct.”);
Daily News Editorial Board, Lesson Learned: Betsy DeVos (Mostly) Gets Title IX
Rules
Right,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-edit-lesson-learned-on-title-ix-20181116story.html (“mostly, DeVos has rebalanced scales that had tipped out of whack.”).
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campus takes place against a backdrop in which ideological fervor
has precipitated a head-on conflict between victims’ rights and
procedural fairness. Amid impassioned cries to “Believe Survivors”—
a standard which suggests that protecting the rights of the accused
is secondary, or even harmful, to achieving just results—it can be
difficult to see the very important difference between a political
slogan and a fair standard of punishment.22 As a means of calling
attention to the social reality of sexual abuse, the call to “Believe
Survivors” has been powerful and effective. But as a method of
adjudicating individual charges of sexual misconduct, it would be a
disaster. Colleges and universities must now recognize this and
amend their codes of conduct accordingly.
But how? What constitutes fair process in this context, and do
the new DOE rules meet that standard? It can be difficult to see
through the fog of political ideology on this topic. But the central
issues are actually quite clear. This Article explains why. It also
develops a model for fairness-based procedure in the context of
college- and university-based sexual misconduct cases, and assesses
DOE’s proposed reforms under that model. I conclude that the
reforms, though not perfect, would go a long way toward restoring
fairness to the process of adjudicating sexual assault on campus.
II. BASELINE: THE LAW OF CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT
Any legitimate process for adjudicating campus-based claims of
sexual misconduct must persuasively answer three questions:

1. Defining Misconduct: With respect to sexual relationships
at colleges and universities, which harms are punishable
“misconduct”? Perhaps the easiest response is “All.” But the
easy answer turns out to be wrong. A fair standard must
clearly define “sexual misconduct,” and must also clearly
delineate related terms (such as “affirmative consent” and
“incapacitation”) that are central to understanding it.

22. For examples of negative reaction to DOE’s proposed rule, see Helen
Rosenthal & Mary Haviland, Campus Sex-Assault Victims, Betrayed: Reject Betsy
DeVos’ Overhaul of Title IX, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2018),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-a-huge-step-back-for-campus-sexassault-victims-20181116-story.html; Amanda Marcotte, Betsy DeVos Moves to
Demolish Title IX, Silence Sexual Abuse Victims, SALON (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.salon.com/2018/11/16/betsy-devos-moves-to-demolish-title-ix-silencesexual-abuse-victims/.
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2. Adjudication Process: When a student has been accused
of sexual misconduct by another student, what procedural
protections and adjudicatory methods are necessary in order
to (1) respect the victim’s claim; (2) protect the rights of the
accused person; and (3) guarantee the integrity of the
university process, thus maximizing the chance that it will
produce accurate answers on the core question of
responsibility? Many of the concerns expressed about recent
case outcomes proceed from perceived defects in this area.23
3. Sanctions: Among the sanctions that are possible in the
collegiate setting, what punishments are appropriate for acts
of sexual misconduct? Again, responding to a number of wellknown cases in which colleges have let offenders off with a
slap on the wrist, it is perhaps tempting, now, to embrace the
other extreme and make expulsion the default sanction for
all cases of sexual misconduct. Some schools have moved that
way.24 Most schools, however, still decide sanctions on a caseby-case basis.25 Which is the better model?
For institutions of higher education, the task of creating and
enforcing fairness in this area is freighted with historical baggage.
Sexual assault is a serious wrong. Colleges and universities have not
always treated it that way, sometimes opting to protect unrelated
institutional interests at the expense of victims’ right to redress.26

23. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 63, 76, 101 (discussing recent Title
IX cases at Northwestern University, Occidental University, and Brandeis
University, respectively).
24. See, e.g., Beth Howard, How Colleges Are Battling Sexual Violence, U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Aug.
28,
2015,
2:58
PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/28/how-colleges-are-battling-sexualviolence (“A growing number of schools are also stiffening penalties for offenders. At
Duke, for example, expulsion is now the favored sanction.”); Jake New, Expulsion
Presumed,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(June
27,
2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/06/27/should-expulsion-be-defaultdiscipline-policy-students-accused-sexual-assault (“Colleges facing criticism over
their handling of sexual assault allegations debate whether the best policy is to
automatically kick out those found guilty.”); see also Howard, supra note 24.
(discussing the policy at Duke University, which makes expulsion the “preferred”
sanction in cases where an accused student has been found responsible for sexual
misconduct).
25. New, supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, JMU Sued for Punishing Sexual Assault with
‘Expulsion After Graduation,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2015, 2:26 PM),
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That is a problem and must be fixed. But simply reversing
direction—forcing respondents, rather than complainants, to suffer
the costs of hasty, reactive, overly politicized adjudications—is
hardly an adequate solution. Higher education must craft a standard
that treats both parties fairly and produces accurate and just
results. Further, the process of investigating and adjudicating
claims of sexual misconduct must not only be fair; it must also be
perceived as fair—in other words, the process should be transparent,
accessible, and explainable to all members of the community.
Of course colleges and universities lack the power to answer
these questions in a vacuum. Although college disciplinary process is
not technically “law” (that is, the rules under which campus
tribunals operate are not created or enforced by legislatures and
courts), formal law has decidedly influenced, and sometimes
dictated, those rules. To understand the reality in which campus
sexual misconduct cases now operate, we first review some basics
about the legal framework that shapes and constrains it.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/09/jmu-sued-sexual-assault_n_6820026.html
(discussing a case where a student-plaintiff filed a Title IX action after James
Madison University found three male students responsible for sexually assaulting
and sexually harassing her, and the school punished them with expulsion after
graduation); see also Walt Bogdanich, A Star Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape
Investigation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/16/sports/errors-in-inquiry-on-rapeallegations-against-fsu-jameis-winston.html. Bogdanich’s article raised questions
about Florida State University’s failure to investigate sexual assault allegations
against its star football player Jameis Winston until after football season ended:
“The athletic department had known early on that Mr. Winston had been accused of
a serious crime. . . . This knowledge should have set off an inquiry by the university.”
Id. “According to federal rules, any athletic department official who learns of possible
sexual misconduct is required to pass it on to school administrators.” Id. “‘Why did
the school not even attempt to investigate the matter until after the football season?’
said John Clune, another lawyer for the accuser.” Id. Bogdanich’s article also quoted
from an interview with former Florida prosecutor Adam Ruiz. Id. Discussing a
sexual assault allegation at F.S.U. that he had prosecuted a decade before the
Jameis Winston case, Mr. Ruiz told The New York Times: “I learned quickly what
football meant in the South . . . . Clearly, it meant a lot. And with respect to this case
I learned that keeping players on the field was a priority.” Id.
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A. The Law of Campus Sexual Assault
The law exerts a significant, but complex, influence on the
creation and implementation of campus sexual misconduct codes.
First, as numerous lawsuits now demonstrate,27 the courts often
serve as the ultimate venue of appeal in cases where either party to
a sexual misconduct allegation feels wronged by the on-campus
process. Second, the courts, the police, and campus personnel must
often follow legal rules that regulate their interaction with each
other in these cases.28 Third, formal law increasingly mandates
particular answers to such core questions as what constitutes sexual
misconduct on college campuses, how such misconduct should be
investigated and adjudicated, and what sanctions should be imposed
when an accused student is found responsible.29 Title IX of the Civil
Rights Amendment Act of 1972 is, obviously, a major source of
positive law in this area, and I discuss that further below.30 First,
however, several other relevant legal sources should be named.

27. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing lawsuits filed by
students protesting sanctions imposed on them by college hearing panels in sexual
misconduct cases). Of course, complainants are also filing suits against universities,
often on the ground that the university mishandled their allegation of sexual
misconduct against another student. See, e.g., Edwin Rios & Madison Pauly, This
Explosive Lawsuit Could Change How Colleges Deal With Athletes Accused of Sexual
Assault,
MOTHER
JONES
(Mar.
3,
2016,
11:00
AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/03/sexual-assault-case-against-universitytennessee-explained (discussing a lawsuit by eight college women who claim that the
University of Tennessee mishandled their sexual assault allegations against football
and basketball players at the school).
28. See, e.g., Ashe Schow, New Campus Sexual Assault Laws Go into Effect in
Virginia,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(July
2,
2015,
1:08
PM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/new-campus-sexual-assault-laws-go-into-effectin-virginia/article/2567530 (discussing new state statutes in Virginia that compel
reporting of sexual misconduct by university employees and regulate interaction
between campus police and local law enforcement).
29. Perhaps responding to this proliferation of law, the American Law
Institute has recently entered the fray. The A.L.I.’s campus-rape project will produce
suggested guidelines for universities, legislatures, and courts charged with creating
and enforcing campus sexual misconduct codes. See Sarah Brown, How a Prominent
Legal Group Could Change the Way Colleges Handle Rape, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://chronicle.com/article/How-a-Prominent-Legal-Group/234467.
30. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688
(2018); see also infra Part II.A.3.
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1. Constitutional Due Process
Due process, in the formal constitutional sense, is of clear but
limited use in designing college sexual misconduct codes. Although
public colleges and universities are considered government actors
and must therefore comply with the commands of due process,31 the
concept itself (as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower
courts) is famously flexible and context-dependent. Under the test
outlined in the Supreme Court’s go-to case Mathews v. Eldridge,32
the amount of process that is “due” in any particular setting
“requires consideration [by courts] of three factors: (1) the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and
(3) the Government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures
would entail.”33 The test captures the bedrock intuition that where a
defendant’s private interest is large and the risk of wrongful results
is great, protective procedures are warranted unless the government
can articulate an interest of overriding importance.
In the educational setting, courts have made clear that due
process is relevant but does not necessarily mandate the full panoply
of procedural rights accorded to criminal defendants. For example,
courts have ruled that some process is “due” to students charged
with disciplinary violations of their public school’s code of conduct.
In the 1975 case of Goss v. Lopez,34 a group of high school students
sued their school claiming that their suspensions violated due
process. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the case set a due
process “floor” consisting of three fundamental requirements. At

31. Private universities are not government actors and are therefore not bound
by the constitutional commands of due process; but, they are constrained by the law
of contract to keep promises they have made to students (for example, promises to
investigate or adjudicate disciplinary cases in a certain way) and to follow their own
rules in good faith. See, e.g., HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE & JOSH GEWOLB, FIRE’S
GUIDE TO DUE PROCESS AND CAMPUS JUSTICE 41–56 (William Creeley ed., 2014),
https://www.thefire.org/first-amendment-library/special-collections/fire-guides/firesguide-to-due-process-and-campus-justice/fires-guide-to-due-process-and-fairprocedure-on-campus-full-text/; see also DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8
(acknowledging the constitutionally based due process obligation of public colleges
and universities).
32. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
33. Id. at 321.
34. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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minimum, the Court held, a public school student facing disciplinary
action of this kind must “be given oral or written notice of the
charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side
of the story.”35 Although Goss itself involved high school students,36
the Supreme Court’s opinion in the case took favorable notice of an
earlier Fifth Circuit case, Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education, involving a due process appeal by college students who
had been expelled from Alabama State College without a hearing.37
In Dixon, the Fifth Circuit held that “the State cannot condition the
granting of even a privilege [such as a college education] upon the
renunciation of a constitutional right to due process.”38
In Goss v. Lopez, the longest student suspension was ten days.39
Notably, the Court opined that in cases threatening more serious
sanctions, due process “may require more formal procedures.”40
Thus, the “floor” is not also a ceiling—a fact that is relevant in the
context of campus sexual assault cases where the punishment for a
finding of liability can include sanctions (such as expulsion and
notations on transcripts and registrar’s records) that not only end a
student’s education at the adjudicating college but as a practical
matter, may end the student’s opportunity to get a college education
at all.41
A number of recent lower-court cases have specifically addressed
the due-process rights of respondents in cases of sexual misconduct
under Title IX. For example, in two Sixth Circuit cases, Doe v.
University of Cincinnati42 and Doe v. Baum,43 the court ruled that in
cases that centrally involve credibility judgments about the
testimony of witnesses, due process requires public universities to
permit the accused to cross-examine the accuser and other adverse
witnesses.44

35. Id. at 581.
36. Id. at 567.
37. 294 F.2d 150, 151–52 (5th Cir. 1961).
38. Id. at 156.
39. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584–85 (Powell, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 584.
41. See, e.g., SILVERGLATE & GEWOLB, supra note 31, at 41–56
42. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017).
43. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018).
44. Id. at 578 (“[I]f a public university has to choose between competing
narratives to resolve a case, the university must give the accused student or his
agent an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the
presence of a neutral fact-finder.”).
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In the spirited national conversation about this subject, the
concept of “due process” has perhaps created more confusion than
clarity. Attorneys and legal scholars tend to employ the term in a
technical sense, referring to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and to the body of
Supreme Court precedent which has grown up around them.45 But in
a broader sense, the calls for due process invoke a normative
standard to which (for example) the constitutional distinctions
between public and private colleges and universities is irrelevant.
That standard concerns the relationship between process and
punishment. It’s a relationship whose fullest expression appears in
the criminal law, but which is ultimately grounded in the more
general concept of fairness. The core idea is simple: When
institutions set out to punish individuals for an offense, they have a
moral obligation (rooted in fairness) to accord the accused person the
fullest possible rights and protections against the possibility of
wrongful conviction.
2. Statutes Specifically Targeting Campus Sexual Misconduct
The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and
Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act), passed in 1990, required
colleges and universities receiving federal aid to collect and publish
information about crimes, including sex crimes, that occur on
campus.46 The Act has since been amended for the purpose of
prompting aid-receiving higher education institutions to develop
policies specifically targeting sexual assault, and to include
requirements that said institutions report the incidence of stalking,
domestic violence, and dating violence.47
45. U.S. CONST. amends V, XIV; see, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization and
State Action: Do Campus Sexual Assault Hearings Violate Due Process?, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 15 (2017) (arguing that constitutional rules surrounding “state action” doctrine
should apply to private as well as public colleges and universities); Jim Newberry,
After the Dear Colleague Letter: Developing Enhanced Due Process Protections for
Title IX Sexual Assault Cases at Public Institutions (unpublished manuscript)
(available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3166561)
(outlining a “vision for due process” which “generally focus[es] on the due process
obligations of public institutions” under the state action doctrine, but urging private
institutions to adopt the same framework).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2018).
47. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat.
1581 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2018)); Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2018)).
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More recent federal and state statutes have specifically
responded to the national debate about sexual assault on campus
and the Obama Administration’s approach to it. State legislatures
and the U.S. Congress have considered or passed statutes
addressing the problem.48
3. Title IX and DOE Regulation
Most of the pressure to amend college and university sexual
misconduct codes came from a third source of law: federal
regulations, specifically those enforced by the DOE as part of Title
IX.49 Title IX itself simply states: “No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”50 Over the years since the statute was enacted, a series
of interpretations by the DOE’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
specified that sexual harassment, including harassment which
creates a “hostile environment,” counts as sex discrimination under
Title IX; that student-upon-student harassment is covered; and that
covered institutions of higher education must create procedures for
ending such harassment.51 During the Obama Administrations, OCR
kicked it up a notch, pressuring colleges and universities to make
their processes more complainant-friendly by launching probes into
non-compliant institutions and threatening to withdraw their
federal funding if they refused.52 By early 2017, more than 200

48. See, e.g., Heather Mongilio, Va. Campus Sexual Assault Bills Signed Into
Law, ARL NOW (May 29, 2015, 1:15 PM), https://www.arlnow.com/2015/05/29/vacampus-sexual-assault-bills-signed-into-law/. California and New York have enacted
“affirmative consent” statutes mandating that all institutions receiving certain state
financial support enact policies which that conform. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386
(West 2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6441 (McKinney 2018); see also Campus
Accountability
and
Safety
Act,
S.
590,
114th
Cong.
(2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/590/text; Safe Campus Act
of 2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/house-bill/3403/text.
49. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
50. Id.
51. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of Title IX regulation, see Gersen
& Suk, supra note 2, at 897–905.
52. See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX’s Unrealized
Capacity to Prevent Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1062–67 (2015)
(describing DOE’s efforts to light a fire under colleges and universities on this issue).
In 2011, the DOE penned its famous Dear Colleague letter, which launched the
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institutions of higher education were under investigation by OCR for
alleged violations of the civil rights of students in sexual assault
cases.53 The Obama OCR made clear that (1) it considered sexual
violence to be actionable under the Department’s Title IX mandate
to fight education-based gender discrimination;54 and (2) it had a
detailed and continuing interest in overseeing university processes
for investigating and punishing sexual misconduct on campus.55
During the Obama years, OCR took the view that, as the subject of
civil litigation under the sexual harassment provisions of Title IX,
allegations of sexual assault on campus should be adjudicated
independently of the criminal process and may feature fewer
procedural protections for accused persons than would be required
for criminal charges.56 In its now-famous Dear Colleague letter of
modern era of sexual misconduct regulation by laying down specific rules and
guidance to colleges and universities as to its policies and procedures in this area.
See generally DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8.
53. See, e.g., Nick Anderson, At First, 55 Schools Faced Sexual Violence
Investigations. Now the List Has Quadrupled, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/01/18/at-first-55-schoolsfaced-sexual-violence-investigations-now-the-list-has-quadrupled/?utm_term=.0ecb3
b 2cc79c.
54. “Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972[, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688
(2018)], and its implementing regulations, [34 C.F.R. § 106 (2018)], prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs or activities operated by
recipients of Federal financial assistance. Sexual harassment of students, which
includes acts of sexual violence, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX.
In order to assist recipients, which include school districts, colleges, and
universities . . . in meeting these obligations, [the Dear Colleague letter] explains
that the requirements of Title IX pertaining to sexual harassment also cover sexual
violence, and lays out the specific Title IX requirements applicable to sexual
violence.” DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8, at 1.
55. See generally DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8 (requiring that
beneficiaries of federal financial assistance conform to Title IX).
56. Id. at 10 (“Police investigations may be useful for fact-gathering; but
because the standards for criminal investigations are different, police investigations
or reports are not determinative of whether sexual harassment or violence violates
Title IX. Conduct may constitute unlawful sexual harassment under Title IX even if
the police do not have sufficient evidence of a criminal violation. In addition, a
criminal investigation into allegations of sexual violence does not relieve the school
of its duty under Title IX to resolve complaints promptly and equitably.”); see also
Alexandra Brodsky & Elizabeth Deutsch, No, We Can’t Just Leave College Sexual
Assault
to
the
Police,
POLITICO
(Dec.
3,
2014),
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/12/uva-sexual-assault-campus-113294 (“The
history of Title IX illuminates a fact that is too often overlooked in conversations
about campus rape today: University adjudication is neither a substitute for nor a
direct parallel to the criminal justice system. After all, student-victims can report to
both their universities and the police; the two systems are not mutually exclusive.
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April 2011, OCR instructed the approximately 7,000 colleges and
universities that accept federal aid to use the lowest possible
standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) in adjudicating
complaints of sexual assault; discouraged institutions from allowing
respondents or their advocates to cross-examine witnesses; allowed
complainants as well as respondents to appeal not-responsible
verdicts (thereby potentially subjecting respondents to the
institutional equivalent of double jeopardy); and set down a time
table of sixty days during which schools should, in general,
adjudicate and dispose of each case.57 In subsequent guidance, OCR
made clear that schools could authorize their Title IX coordinators to
investigate complaints and to determine sanctions and supportive
measures upon findings of responsibility.58
The Obama OCR also made clear that colleges and universities
must have an independent process for adjudicating these cases—
that it would not be acceptable, for example, for a college to simply
defer all complaints of sexual assault on campus to the police and
the criminal system. This federal mandate—that colleges must
investigate and decide these cases themselves—essentially forced
institutions of higher education to independently adjudicate sexual
misconduct complaints or face the possibilities of federal
investigation and loss of federal funding.59
In response, colleges and universities overhauled their sexual
misconduct codes in accordance with the 2011 letter and other OCR
guidance documents that followed.60 By 2015, many had begun to
implement the new codes. The results thus far have been decidedly
mixed. While some empirical evidence suggests that the number of
sexual assault claims has risen on campuses nationwide61—a
Campus adjudication is a separate antidiscrimination right protecting students’
access to educational opportunities at their schools, unburdened by historical and
persistent gender-based disparities. (In this way, Title IX mirrors not the criminal
justice system but Title VII, the federal workplace antidiscrimination law that
recognizes the particular impediments to equality that may arise in an employment
context and which requires employers to respond to violence reports.)”).
57. See generally DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8.
58. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 12, at 11.
59. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8, at 4 (“[T]he school’s Title IX
investigation is different from any law enforcement investigation, and a law
enforcement investigation does not relieve the school of its independent Title IX
obligation to investigate the conduct.”).
60. See, e.g., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 12.
61. See, e.g., Max Kutner, U.S. Students Filed Record 10,000 Civil Rights
Complaints
Last
Year,
NEWSWEEK
(May
4,
2016,
4:49
PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/department-education-office-civil-rights-report-455752.
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possible indication that victims now feel more comfortable bringing
such claims forward—serious concerns about the accuracy,
transparency, impartiality, and overall fairness of campus-based
adjudications have also been expressed.62
B. Some Troubling Cases
A few recent Title IX cases (a hostile environment case that did
not involve a charge of sexual assault and three other cases that did
charge sexual assault) offer a better sense of where things stand
today.
Case 1. A feminist professor at a top university, published an
article about “sexual paranoia” on campus, arguing that a recently
enacted sexual misconduct code at the university had “infantilized”
students and could reinforce invidious stereotypes of women.63 In
response to the piece, two graduate students at the university filed a
Title IX claim against the professor on the ground that her article
violated the university’s sex harassment policy.64 The university’s
president announced that he would consider the petition.65 Some two
weeks later, the campus Title IX administrator informed the accused
professor of the action against her, adding that (1) the university
had retained outside counsel who would question her about her
article; (2) she (the professor-respondent) had no right to an attorney
and would be limited to assistance from a university “support
person” who would not be allowed to speak during the proceedings;
and (3) she would not be informed of the charges against her before
62. Gersen & Suk, supra note 2, at 884; see also Jeannie Suk Gersen, Laura
Kipnis’s Endless Trial by Title IX, NEW YORKER (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/laura-kipniss-endless-trial-by-title-ix.
Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk’s more general critique of “bureaucratic sex creep”—
of which the increasing regulation of sex on campus is a prime example—is also well
worth reading in this context. See generally Gersen & Suk, supra note 2 (providing
examples of demographics such as ethnicity being excluded from reports, which
prevent the public from recognizing patterns of injustice).
63. Laura Kipnis, Sexual Paranoia Strikes Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://chronicle.com/article/Sexual-Paranoia-Strikes/190351/. The
Kipnis case is a case of campus-based sexual harassment, but not sexual assault,
under Title IX. Id. The procedural defaults which characterized the handling of her
case by Northwestern, however, have become common to both types of cases. See
generally LAURA KIPNIS, UNWANTED ADVANCES: SEXUAL PARANOIA COMES TO
CAMPUS (2017) (offering a broad discussion of the Kipnis case).
64. Laura Kipnis, My Title IX Inquisition, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 29,
2015), http://chronicle.com/article/My-Title-IX-Inquisition/230489/.
65. Id.
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she was questioned about them.66 The professor later recalled:
“Apparently the idea was that they’d tell me the charges, and then,
while I was collecting my wits, interrogate me about them. The term
‘kangaroo court’ came to mind.”67 The professor received the same
refusal when she asked the university’s investigators themselves for
advance notice of the charges against her.68 The investigators
eventually agreed to inform the professor-respondent of the charges
in advance of the interrogation but denied her request to record the
session, refused to give her a written copy of the charges against her,
and asked her not to speak publicly about the matter.69 By contrast,
a graduate student at the university published an attack on the
professor’s article that revealed the existence of the Title IX
complaints and demonstrated more knowledge about the university’s
process for resolving such complaints than the university had seen
fit to share with the accused professor.70 Meanwhile, the designated
university “support person,” a member of the Faculty Senate who
had accompanied the accused professor to a meeting with the
investigators, himself became the target of a Title IX investigation
for speaking in the Senate about his concern that the university
process he had witnessed violated academic freedom.71
The university’s Title IX investigators informed the respondent
that the case would be decided under a “preponderance of the
evidence” standard of proof but refused her access to the evidence

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The same thing happened when Professor Kipnis asked the universityhired investigators to see the charges against her before meeting with them: “They
told me, cordially, that they wanted to set up a meeting during which they would
inform me of the charges and pose questions.” Id.; see also TheFIREorg, In Her Own
Words: Laura Kipnis’ ‘Title IX Inquisition’ at Northwestern (VIDEO), YouTube (Apr.
6, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVGOp0IffOQ (Professor Kipnis: “You
never get the charges in writing, and I’ve heard that from other people since.”).
69. Kipnis, supra note 64 (“We finally agreed to schedule a Skype session in
which they would inform me of the charges and I would not answer questions. . . . I
said I wanted to record the session; they refused but said I could take notes. The
reasons for these various interdictions were never explained. I’d plummeted into an
underground world of secret tribunals and capricious, medieval rules, and I wasn’t
supposed to tell anyone about it.”).
70. Id.; see also Lauren Leydon-Hardy, What’s a President to Do?: Trampling
Title IX and Other Scary Ideas, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2015, 3:50 PM),http:
//www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-leydonhardy/whats-a-president-to-do-tramplingtitle-ix-and-other-scary-ideas_b_7001932.html (discussing the Title IX action against
Professor Kipnis and defending the complainants in that action).
71. Kipnis, supra note 63.
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that would form the basis of their findings.72 Under the university’s
procedures for handling this type of Title IX complaint, investigators
make affirmative findings as to the facts and the misconduct
charge—in short, they simultaneously act as investigators and
adjudicators in the case.73 The professor was informed that she must
wait sixty days for their report in order to know what those findings
were.74 The professor was given no opportunity to present her case
at a hearing where she might learn the evidentiary basis for either
of the two complaints against her.75
Case 2. On a weekend evening early in their first semester, two
college freshmen (whom I will call Jack and Jill) got drunk at
separate events, then spent the night together having sex.76 Before
going to Jack’s room to have sex with him, Jill texted Jack to confirm
that he had a condom.77 She then texted a friend and informed her
that she, Jill, intended to have sex. 78 Upon arriving in Jack’s room,
Jill again asked for a condom.79 During the night a friend stopped by
Jack’s room to see if Jill was alright; she said that she was.80 The
next morning both Jill and Jack had very partial memories about
what had happened.81 Nonetheless, Jill filed a Title IX action against
Jack for sexual assault.82
College policy at the time provided that contested complaints of
this kind would normally be adjudicated by a hearing panel
consisting of faculty and administrators.83 Instead the college hired a
local employment law attorney to adjudicate the case—a decision the

72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Professor Kipnis’s “trial by Title IX” did not end there. See Suk Gersen,
supra note 61 (detailing the subsequent Title IX-based targeting of Professor Kipnis).
76. Richard Dorment, Occidental Justice: The Disastrous Fallout When Drunk
Sex Meets Academic Bureaucracy, ESQUIRE (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.esquire.com/
news-politics/a33751/ occidental-justice-case/.
77. Id.
78. See id. (citing the relevant texts from the college’s official report on the
incident).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (“According to college policy, ‘Formal resolution of a complaint . . . will
occur through the use of a Conduct Conference’—which is recommended for
uncontested accusations—‘or a Hearing Panel . . . which typically consist of three
members drawn from a pool of trained faculty and campus administrators.’”).
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college refused to explain.84 By a chain of reasoning that apparently
complied with the college misconduct code, the college-hired
adjudicator found that (1) Jack and Jill had sex; (2) Jack could have
reasonably believed that Jill had in fact consented to sex; (3)
although Jill was moving under her own power and was aware of
where she was at the time, she was so drunk that she was
incapacitated under the college’s definition of that state; (4) Jack
was intoxicated too, but his intoxication would not affect the
outcome; (5) had Jack not been intoxicated, he would have perceived
that Jill was too drunk to validly consent to sex; and therefore, (6)
Jack had sexually assaulted Jill.85 Jack was expelled from the
college.86
Because the outcome of the action would appear on his transcript
and in the records of the college registrar, Jack had scant chance of
being admitted to any other college.87 After his expulsion, Jack
attempted to counterclaim. He argued that Jill had initiated the
sexual encounter and since he, Jack, was also drunk at the time, Jill
had sexually assaulted him.88 Jack’s attorney advised him that
anything Jack said in the college proceeding could be used against
him in a subsequent legal proceeding, but the college refused Jack’s
request to bring his attorney to meet with college officials.89 When
Jack declined to meet without his attorney, the college rejected his
counterclaim.90 Under the circumstances, it appeared that Jill had
gained an unrebuttable advantage simply by filing first, suggesting
that under college policy, vindication belonged to the speedy rather
than to the just. The next case may support that suspicion.91
84. Id. (“Occidental’s policy permits it to appoint an external adjudicator at its
sole discretion. It declined to explain its decision, either to [Jack]’s attorney or to
Esquire.”).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. In fact, his admission to one other college was rescinded when that
college discovered that he had been expelled for sexual assault. Id. Jack’s admission
to yet another college was not immediately rescinded only because he successfully
petitioned a court to stay the college’s order and sanctions pending the outcome of his
lawsuit against the college. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Caitlin Flanagan, Mutually Nonconsensual Sex, ATLANTIC (June
1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/title-ix-is-too-easy-toabuse/561650/ (“[T]he functionaries of the college sex panic have an obdurate habit of
determining that the victim of a blearily remembered amorous encounter is the
person who decides to report it, with all ties broken by the one who reports it first.”).
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Case 3. “Jack’s” attempted countersuit, above, suggests that
some college misconduct policies contain such vague definitions of
key terms like “consent” and “incapacitation” that either party, or
both parties, might be guilty of sexual assault. A more recent case
makes this even more clear. Plaintiff “Jane Roe” was suspended
from a state university for engaging in sexual contact with another
student who was intoxicated (and therefore incapacitated and
unable to consent).92 Plaintiff Roe filed suit in protest, averring the
following facts: Jane Roe and “John Doe,” both students at the
university, attended a party on September 30, 2017.93 Both were
drinking. After John Doe said he wanted to go home because he was
drunk, the two left the party together and went to John Doe’s house,
where Jane Roe fell asleep on John Doe’s bed.94 At some point that
night, John Doe climbed into bed with Jane Roe and the two had
sexual contact which involved John Doe touching Jane Roe’s vagina,
after which Jane Roe inquired, “Is there anything else you want to
do?”95 John Doe answered in the negative, and both went back to
sleep.96 Two days later John Doe filed a Title IX complaint alleging
that Jane Roe had engaged in sexual conduct with John Doe while
the latter was incapacitated and therefore unable to consent.97 The
university agreed and Jane Roe was suspended indefinitely.98 In her
lawsuit Jane Roe claimed that the school violated her constitutional
rights, not only because it disciplined her in the case, but also
because it failed to discipline John Doe—suggesting that, under the
facts of the case, John Doe was actually the perpetrator.99 The case
demonstrates the bizarre reality that, under the terms of many
schools’ sexual misconduct codes, both parties to a particular sexual
encounter may be guilty of assaulting each other.100
92. See id.
93. Robby Soave, Male Student Accuses Female Student of Sexual Assault. She
Says He Wanted Revenge, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (May 11, 2018, 4:15 PM),
https://reason.com/blog/2018/05/11/cincinnati-rape-title-ix-doe-roe-sex.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Complaint at 29, Roe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1-18-cv-00312TSB (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018); Flanagan, supra note 91 (“Is it possible for two people
to simultaneously sexually assault each other? This is the question . . . [that] the
University of Cincinnati now addresses . . . .”); Soave, supra note 93 (discussing the
same case and opining that “Title IX creates a prisoner’s dilemma: students have to
file sexual misconduct complaint to avoid becoming the accused”).
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Case 4. Finally, another perplexing issue arising from the
vagueness of college codes: Is there such a thing as normal sex? In
their comprehensive critique of the “sex bureaucracy” created under
Title IX, Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk discuss the case of Doe v.
Brandeis University,101 in which the plaintiff challenged the
university’s determination that he had committed “serious sexual
transgressions” and the university’s placement of a permanent
notation in to that effect in his educational record.102 The student’s
alleged offenses included:
[T]ouching the clothed groin of the complainant (who would
soon be his boyfriend) while the two watched a movie;
occasionally waking his boyfriend with a kiss; looking at his
boyfriend’s groin while showering together; and, while at his
boyfriend’s father’s house, attempting to perform oral sex
when his boyfriend did not want it.103
To state the facts of these cases is to name the arguments
against them. Particularly troubling are:
• The secrecy of campus sexual misconduct proceedings,
which has the foreseeable effects of making such proceedings
impervious to public critique or accountability, and of
allowing inaccurate rumors (e.g., that an expelled student is
a “rapist” when no allegation of rape has been made or
charged) to spread unchecked.104
• The lack of a process for filtering out false or flimsy
allegations before subjecting a respondent to a full-scale
investigation.105
• Inadequate notice to accused persons of potentially
career-ending sexual misconduct charges against them.106
• The refusal to set down allegations in writing.107

101. 177 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mass. 2016).
102. Gersen & Suk, supra note 2, at 938 (citing Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d
at 571).
103. Id.
104. See Kipnis, supra note 64.
105. See, e.g., id. (“As I understand it, any Title IX charge that’s filed has to be
investigated, which effectively empowers anyone on campus to individually decide,
and expand, what Title IX covers. Anyone with a grudge, a political agenda, or a
desire for attention can quite easily leverage the system.”).
106. See, e.g., id. (claiming that she would not receive information on the
substance of the complaint until she met with investigators).
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• The refusal to allow the accused person to see the evidence
against him or her before the case is adjudicated.108
• The refusal to offer a full and fair hearing staffed by
impartial, well-trained personnel.109
• The refusal to permit well-trained advocates for the
parties and allow them, by questioning of witnesses, to reveal
the strengths and weaknesses of the case before such a
panel.110
• The vagueness of key terms in college conduct codes—
“coercion,” “consent,” and “incapacitation”—which are often
defined in language so broad that it fails to inform students
and college adjudicators about the nature of sexual
misconduct.111
• The fact that some colleges and universities have done
away with the requirement of a live hearing in sexual
misconduct cases. Instead, these institutions have put their
Title IX administrator in charge of the entire adjudicatory
process (excluding appeals), presenting an obvious threat of
bias resulting from an equally obvious conflict of interest
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., id. (claiming that she was not presented with any evidence
against her).
109. Many of the new campus codes provide that investigators and adjudicators
in these cases must be “trained.” But since most do not require that such personnel
have actual law-enforcement or criminal adjudication experience, it is unclear what
such training consists of or how rigorous it might or might not be. The outside
adjudicator in the Occidental case, for example, was a local attorney who specialized
in employment law. Dorment, supra note 76. The university refused to explain why it
had chosen her to adjudicate the matter or disclose any prior relevant experience or
training she may have had in adjudicating cases of sexual misconduct either in the
civil or the criminal sphere. See id. This is not to say that she, or other adjudicators,
never do have such experience. Some do. The concern is that broad university
discretion on the issue keeps the public, including those accused of sexual
misconduct, in the dark about who will decide the case and what their qualifications
may be.
110. See Kipnis, supra note 64 (claiming that the school would not allow the
accused to have a lawyer present, but would allow a “support person” from the
university community, even though that person would not be allowed to speak).
111. See, e.g., Dorment, supra note 76. “[I]n an apparent effort to show
Occidental’s inconsistent application of its own sexual-assault policies, John filed a
sexual-assault complaint against Jane Doe with Occidental. He claimed she did not
obtain his consent prior to performing oral sex on him—as he doesn’t even recall this
happening, and nobody ever asked Jane whether she received consent from John, he
believes it should be subject to the same scrutiny under which he was investigated.”
Id. Because John would not meet with Occidental’s investigator without his attorney,
the college refused to consider his complaint. Id.
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between the Title IX office’s priorities and the rights of
persons accused of sexual misconduct.112
• Colleges’ apparent willingness, while denying accused
respondents the most basic procedural protections, to impose
the harshest possible sanctions for sexual assault in the
murkiest cases: where both parties were drinking heavily,
neither party remembers key facts, and it may actually be
impossible to determine with anything like reasonable
confidence which, if either, party to an act of sex committed
assault on the other.113
• The apparent willingness to adjudicate such cases under
the lowest possible standard of proof, again while
simultaneously and substantially raising the possible
sanctions upon a finding of responsibility.114

112. Harvard University adopted such a system in 2014, prompting a widely
publicized protest from twenty-eight members of the Harvard Law faculty, who
collectively wrote: “Among our many concerns [with Harvard’s new sexual
misconduct policy and procedures] are the following: Harvard has adopted
procedures for deciding cases of alleged sexual misconduct which lack the most basic
elements of fairness and due process, are overwhelmingly stacked against the
accused, and are in no way required by Title IX law or regulation.” See Rethink
Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment
-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html. The signators’ concerns “include
but are not limited to the following: [1] The absence of any adequate opportunity to
discover the facts charged and to confront witnesses and present a defense at an
adversary hearing. [2] The lodging of the functions of investigation, prosecution, factfinding, and appellate review in one office, and the fact that that office is itself a Title
IX compliance office rather than an entity that could be considered structurally
impartial.” Id.
113. See generally Dorment, supra note 76 (discussing the Occidental case).
114. See e.g., supra text accompanying notes 76–91 (discussing Case 2); see also
Dorment, supra note 76 (“In a letter rebutting John’s appeal to Occidental, Jane’s
lawyers wrote, ‘Ms. Jane Doe was raped by . . . John Doe’ . . . which suggests just
how empty the distinction really is between sexual assault as a breach of student
conduct and rape as a criminal offense.”). Additionally, according to feminist Law
Professor Janet Halley of Harvard: “The idea that what we’re talking about here is
just a civil sanction, the equivalent of money damages, is unreal to me. When we
expel or suspend a student and put that on the transcript, it’s going to be very hard
for that person to go to any other institution of higher education.” Id. Further
discussing Harvard’s revamped procedure for adjudicating sexual misconduct cases,
Professor Halley told Esquire: “Every legal lever has been ticked in the direction of
the accuser and against the [accused] . . . . I think it’s almost in bad faith to be
arguing that we ‘need’ [the preponderance standard] because we have to get equality
of the parties. It’s called going too far.” Id. (alteration in original).
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• The potential for use of Title IX investigations and
disciplinary sanctions to enforce a particular set of opinions
about sex and sexual activity on campus and/or to punish
faculty or students for holding or expressing unpopular views
on a wide range of issues.115
It would be unfair to suggest that these procedural faults now
infect the misconduct codes of all colleges and universities. Thus far,
and in the absence of a generally accepted set of guidelines, schools
have mainly been “going at it on their own,” with the result that
investigation and adjudication procedures in sexual misconduct
cases vary widely from institution to institution.116 Some systems
offer relatively strong procedural protections to accused respondents;
others do not. The problem is that the troubling procedures named
above do not clearly violate current standards of fair process in the
context of campus adjudications. The denial or under-emphasizing of
fundamental tenets of fair process (e.g., notice to an accused person
of the charges against him or her, a full opportunity to test the
evidence, and an impartial adjudication by trained personnel) raises
concern about the system as a whole, even if some colleges have thus
far succeeded in avoiding such deficits. The process of investigating
and adjudicating claims that may result in serious punishment must
not only be fair, it must also be perceived to be fair. Fair process, in
turn, compels the laying of a sound procedural floor, a minimum set

115. See, e.g., Kipnis, supra note 64 (“Title IX officers now adjudicate an
increasing range of murky situations involving mutual drunkenness, conflicting
stories, and relationships gone wrong. They pronounce on the thorniest of
philosophical and psychological issues: What is consent? What is power? Should
power differentials between romantic partners be proscribed?”); Suk Gersen, supra
note 62.
116. See, e.g., Gina Maisto Smith & Leslie M. Gomez, The Regional Center for
Investigation and Adjudication: A Proposed Solution to the Challenges of Title IX
Investigations in Higher Education, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 27, 29–30
(“[B]est practice models remain elusive. Even assuming there is a perfect alchemy in
policy language, [college and university] administrators are clamoring for standards
of care that serve the needs of complainants, respondents, and institutions . . . .”).
The American Law Institute is now conducting the “Project on Sexual and GenderBased Misconduct on Campus,” which will address a variety of procedural issues
including the investigation and adjudication of sexual misconduct and sexual assault
cases. See Student Sexual Misconduct: Procedural Frameworks for Colleges and
Universities, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/project-sexual-andgender-based-misconduct-campus-procedural-frameworks-and-analysis/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2018).
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of structural protections necessary to produce accurate adjudication
and when responsibility is duly found, just punishment.
In the context of campus-based sexual misconduct complaints,
what protections fit that description? To decide, we need to think
more deeply about the purposes of such adjudication, the extent to
which it can do justice of the kind appropriate in an educational
context, and the structural limits to fair and accurate adjudication
and punishment in a setting which necessarily lacks the full panoply
of protections offered to an accused person in court. In Part III, I
argue that the core principles governing punishment—whether in
court or in a campus hearing panel—are found in criminal law.
III. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM, PARSIMONY,
PROPORTIONALITY
Reformists claim that campus misconduct proceedings should
not be analogized to criminal cases.117 Instead, they claim, these
adjudications are civil, intra-institutional proceedings involving a
college’s interpretation of its own code of conduct.118 If the law
applies at all, under this argument, the appropriate body of doctrine
is solely on the civil side (Title IX and gender discrimination), not
the law of rape.119
It is of course true by definition that college misconduct
proceedings are not criminal prosecutions. But that fact does not
answer any important questions. No one would argue that since
college disciplinary procedures are not “legal” in any formal sense,
such procedures need not concern themselves with fairness or
accuracy. Fairness and accuracy should be important goals
whenever institutional punishment is at issue. The real question,
then, is what rights and procedures must such adjudications include
in order to make them as fair and accurate as possible? The answer
need not simply replicate the criminal process. But because they
involve the potential infliction of serious punishment, college sexual
misconduct adjudications should hew closely to the core principles
that have produced that process.

117. See, e.g., Alexandra Brodsky, Fair Process, Not Criminal Process, Is the
Right Way to Address Campus Sexual Assault, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://prospect.org/article/fair-process-not-criminal-process-right-way-addresscampus-sexual-assault.
118. Id.
119. Id. (“School investigations don’t look like trials because they aren’t
supposed to.”).
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A. Conflicting Intuitions
Our national conversation about sexual assault on campus
reflects deep ambivalence about the criminal law of sexual assault.
Victim advocates argue that colleges must treat sexual assault on
campus “as the violent felony that it actually is.”120 But they
simultaneously argue that campus-based adjudication of sexual
assault cases is not a criminal matter and should therefore eject
cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming procedural protections—
such as an accused’s rights to an attorney, to confront witnesses, to a
high standard of proof, and to a formal and impartial hearing—that
are considered fundamental rights in the criminal setting.121 Jointly,
these two assertions imply that (1) college sexual misconduct policies
need not offer the procedural protections that would necessarily
attend a criminal accusation of rape, but (2) in order to treat sexual
assault as the “violent felony that it is,”122 they should nonetheless
impose harsh penalties upon parties found responsible.
The tension between these two intuitions is easily demonstrated
by reference to the different levels of procedural protection present
in the civil and criminal court systems generally. “Due process” is
relevant in both settings, but means very different things in each.123
In contrast with the criminal process, civil defendants have fewer

120. Cathy Young, New Campus Rape Bill Offers a Better Way, REALCLEAR
POL. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/08/07/new_
campus_rape_bill_offers_a_better_way_127695.html (quoting remarks made by U.S.
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand); see Nicole Hart, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand Talks
Combating Campus Sexual Assaults, NEWS10 (May 1, 2015, 8:38 AM),
https://www.news10.com/news/kristen-gillibrand-heads-to-schenectady-to-discusssexual-assault-on-campus/1108076359 (“[T]he senator’s message was loud and clear:
sexual assault is not okay and will not be tolerated. ‘We need to define this crime for
the crime that it is,’ she said. ‘Rape is a felony. It is a violent felony.’”).
121. See, e.g., The Toughest Issue on (Any) Campus, YALE ALUMNI MAG.,
July/Aug. 2015, https://yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/4105-the-toughest-issue-oni-any-i-campus?page=2 (quoting feminist and former federal judge Nancy Gertner:
“Sexual harassment is not a crime. It is a civil action. And it is covered by university
policy.”).
122. Young, supra note 120.
123. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 14 (2006) (“The Supreme Court approaches procedural due process
quite differently in its criminal and civil decisions, both in how it talks about due
process and how it conceptualizes what due process requires.”).
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constitutionally-rooted procedural rights.124 These differences accord
with the more general principle of proportionality—the idea that
there should be a proportional relationship between the procedural
rights accorded to a defendant and the potential consequences of a
finding of liability. Felony convictions carry the potential for a
particular kind of stigma and for prison time, punishments that as
categories we think significantly more serious than the monetary
compensation which typically results from a finding of civil liability.
Because they often pose the threat of heavy punishment, “violent
felonies” in criminal law are carefully defined, investigated by
professionally-trained personnel who must operate within firmly
established constitutional and statutory mandates, prosecuted and
defended by professionally trained advocates, adjudicated under our
most exacting standard of proof (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) in
order to minimize the chance of arbitrary or otherwise unjust
convictions, and punished according to a rule of sentencing
proportionality that links the sanction imposed to the severity of the
offense.125 In short, because criminal punishment is especially harsh,
justice requires that we offer defendants a correspondingly high
level of procedural protection so we can be sure that convicted
defendants actually did the crime and deserve the associated
punishment.126

124. See id. at 8 (“[T]he essential element of procedural due process, as clearly
established in civil settings, is that notice and a hearing must ordinarily precede any
governmental deprivation of a liberty or property interest.”); id at 9–11 (describing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and its three-pronged test for procedural
due process in civil settings); see also supra text accompanying note 33 (discussing
Mathews and its implications for disciplinary proceedings at public educational
institutions).
125. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CAROL S. STEIKER
& RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
186 (9th ed. 2012) (“The requirement that punishment be proportional to the
seriousness of the offense is a core principle of punishment, both as a central limit
dictated by the Eighth Amendment, and a statutory statement of purpose in modern
criminal codes.”); Kuckes, supra note 123, at 18 (reviewing constitutionally
guaranteed rights of criminal defendants who go to trial and noting that “at trial, a
criminal defendant receives an impressive degree of ‘process’ constitutionally
required to adjudicate his guilt or innocence”); Criminal Procedure, LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/criminal_procedure (last visited Nov. 19,
2018).
126. See, e.g., Criminal Procedure, supra note 125 (“Once a trial begins, the U.S.
Constitution affords further rights to criminal defendants. Trying to avoid convicting
an innocent defendant at all costs, the law only permits the prosecution to overcome
the defendant’s presumption of innocence if they can show the defendant’s guilt
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B. Campus Sexual Misconduct Tribunals Inflict Punishment
As a threshold matter, it might be necessary to establish the
proposition that college and university sexual misconduct
proceedings are, in fact, “punitive” in the sense requisite to the
central argument here. To those familiar with the debate on this
issue, it might appear silly to argue otherwise—the intent to punish
offenders found responsible for sexual assault seems abundantly
clear.127 “The idea that what we’re talking about [in campus sexual
assault adjudications] is just a civil sanction, the equivalent of
money damages, is unreal to me,” notes Professor Janet Halley of
Harvard Law School.128 “When we expel or suspend a student and
put that on the transcript, it’s going to be very hard for that person
to go to any other institution of higher education.”129
University sexual misconduct panels are not criminal courts, are
not necessarily staffed by lawyers or judges, and do not have the
power to impose prison time on offenders found responsible.
Nonetheless, sexual misconduct proceedings are clearly punitive—
both in intent and effect. The intent (as well as the primary goal and
effect) of disciplinary proceedings in college sexual assault cases is to
inflict penalties on persons found responsible for sexual misconduct.
Further, such penalties are potentially the most severe sanctions
available in the college setting—for example, expulsion and
permanent notation of the findings and sanction on the offender’s
transcript.130 Finally, such penalties are not meant to “compensate”
the victim of the assault in the way that tort or contract damages
are. Instead, they are designed to single out the offender for
condemnation and punishment.131

beyond a reasonable doubt. This very high burden differs drastically from a civil
trial’s much lower standard in which the plaintiff must only prove a claim by a
preponderance of the evidence.”).
127. See, e.g., Criminal Procedure, supra note 125; see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
128. Dorment, supra note 76.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Tovia Smith, Push Grows for a ‘Scarlet Letter’ on Transcripts of
Campus
Sexual
Offenders,
NPR
(May
11,
2016,
4:27
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2016/05/11/477656378/push-grows-for-a-scarlet-letter-on-transcri
pts-of-campus-sexual-offenders (“When it comes to punishing students for campus
sexual assault, some say kicking offenders out of school isn’t enough. They want
schools to put a permanent note on offenders’ transcripts explaining that they’ve

2018]

RESTORING FAIRNESS

1101

College administrators sometimes claim that campus misconduct
proceedings are not constrained by concerns like the presumption of
innocence or the right to counsel—core elements of the modern
criminal process—because the sanctions imposed on responsible
offenders are not “punishment” at all. Instead, they claim, the
sanctions are a means of rehabilitating offenders and educating
them in good behavior.132 This argument is not persuasive. To
“punish” means “to impose a penalty on, for a fault, offense, or
violation.”133 Criminal punishment can be, and often is, justified as a
means of educating or “rehabilitating” offenders. College sexual
misconduct proceedings are punitive because they involve the
knowing and intentional infliction, by the college and under the
authority of its code, of painful consequences on the offenders found
responsible for violating college policy with the deliberate purpose of
expressing condemnation of the offender and the offense.134 That
been punished for sexual misconduct, so other schools—or employers—can be
warned.”).
132. Id. “Administrators stress that the college judicial system is . . . ‘not the
same thing as a court of law.’ . . . Even their mission differs from the criminal justice
system: Verdicts are educational, not punitive, opportunities. Alleged student victims
may expect punishment from campus proceedings, says Jerry Price, vice chancellor
for student affairs at Chapman University, in California, ‘but there is nothing in our
mission about justice.’” Id.; see, e.g., Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for
Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/2
4/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-assault (last updated July 14, 2014, 5:40 PM)
(“College administrators stress that the sanctioning in disciplinary matters reflects
the mission of higher education. Proceedings aren’t meant to punish students, but
rather to teach them. ‘We’d like to think that we can always educate and hold
accountable the student,’ says Pamela Freeman, associate dean of students at
Indiana University. IU officials defended suspending [a respondent in a case at that
university] as, in effect, a teachable moment.”).
133. Punish,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/punish (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
134. Consider, by analogy, the definition of legal punishment offered by H.L.A.
Hart: “[T]he standard or central case of ‘punishment’ in terms of five elements: (i) It
must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant. (ii) It must
be for an offence against legal [here, college or university] rules. (iii) It must be of an
actual or supposed offender for his offence. (iv) It must be intentionally administered
by human beings other than the offender. (v) It must be imposed and administered
by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is
committed.” H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4–5 (2d ed. 2008). As for element (v), the analogy to authority
constituted by college policy is clear. Beyond that, a persuasive argument could be
made that legal authorities (including Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
and its interpretation by the DOE) place college sexual misconduct proceedings
squarely within Hart’s element (v). See id.; see also Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2018); DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER,
supra note 8, at 8.
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such actions may be also justified by the goal of rehabilitation does
not distinguish them from punishment.
Again, campus sexual assault adjudications are not criminal
trials, and the procedures of criminal law need not be wholly
imported into such adjudications. But campus proceedings should be
powerfully influenced by the same concerns about accuracy,
impartiality, and fairness that animate criminal law. The two
systems need not share identical procedural rules, but they do share
the underlying values and principles which produce those specifics.
Those fundamental principles are the Harm Principle and the
related principles of Parsimony and Proportionality.135
None of what follows is new; most of it, in fact, is so firmly
instantiated into criminal law that it is usually taken as given. But
that is really the point. Campus sexual misconduct codes lack a
coherent set of principles upon which to ground the structure of
adjudications; such principles do underlie the criminal process, and
they should serve as a model for other forms of institutional
punishment.
C. Centrality of the Harm Principle
Criminal law, of course, spells out the conditions under which
defendants can be convicted and punished for harming others. But—
and this is crucial to remember in the current context—criminal
prohibitions do not target the infliction of all harms. Instead, from
the universe of possible harms that one person might inflict on
another, the law selects a subset for criminal punishment. Consider
a basic example. John owns ABC Enterprises, a successful and
longstanding business which produces and sells widgets. Having
developed a cheaper and higher-quality widget than John’s, Jane
establishes XYZ Enterprises directly across the street from John’s
business. Jane sells her “super-widgets” at a lower price than John’s,
eventually driving John out of business. Clearly Jane has caused
“harm” to John (John would certainly think so!), but in deference to
the perceived social benefits of commercial competition, the law will
generally not offer redress for that harm. Instead, the law would
defend Jane’s right to compete with John’s business, even though
ABC Enterprises came first. John has certainly been harmed by
Jane, but that harm lacks a legal remedy (and certainly lacks a
criminal remedy).

135.

See infra Parts III.D–III.E.
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This example also illustrates what might be called the “hierarchy
of harm” with respect to the law. Some harms are not redressable by
law, period. Some harms—usually those deemed compensable but
not necessarily punishable—are redressable only by civil suit and
not by the criminal law. A third set of harms—typically those which
inflict what we deem to be the most serious injuries to persons or
property—are redressable by criminal action, an action in which
society is the plaintiff and sanctions frequently involve
imprisonment or the threat thereof. Criminal sanctions, therefore,
constitute a subset of legally redressable harms.
Return to the above example. Although in general the law does
not give John the right to stop Jane from competing with him or his
business, Jane’s right to compete is not limitless. Suppose that,
instead of simply underselling John, Jane establishes XYZ
Enterprises across the street from him, begins selling widgets at a
higher price than John’s, then sends her goons over to burn down
John’s store, thereby driving John out of business. In that case the
law would offer John redress, including criminal redress, for
example via a prosecution against Jane (and the goons) for arson.
The important thing to notice is that the different outcome in the
two situations does not hinge on the existence or absence of harm;
John has been “harmed” in both scenarios. The difference hinges on
the law’s decision as to which kind of harm will be legally (including
criminally) protected—in other words, which party has the legal
right to protection from the other. Because the law views
competition as presumptively beneficial, in the former case it sides
with Jane: Jane harmed John but did not violate his rights. In the
latter case, however, Jane engaged in methods of competition which
are deemed not socially beneficial and so the legal right shifts to
John—in that case the harm Jane inflicted did violate John’s rights
(by using arson, rather than sales of cheaper widgets, to drive John
out of business), and the violation was serious enough to be a
criminal wrong. Jane may harm John by selling a better product at a
lower price and thereby driving him out of business, but she may not
legally harm him by burning down his store to drive him out of
business. Another way to say the same thing: I have the right to
compete against you by making and selling a superior product, even
if that competition harms you by winning away your customers. I do
not have the right to intentionally destroy your property, even if my
motive in doing so is exactly the same—to win your customers.
Thus, only some harms generate rights that are the subject of
criminal prohibitions, and for violation of which the criminal law will
punish guilty defendants. The rights which it so defends are those
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which (1) society accepts as legitimate bases for state-inflicted
punishment and (2) are feasibly definable, provable, and enforceable
by the courts.136 And for present purposes we need only agree that,
whatever the complete list of criminally actionable “rights,” the right
to be free from undeserved physical harm—which certainly includes
the right not be sexually abused or assaulted—is among them.
Criminal law (not exclusively, but in particular) punishes those who
commit, or threaten to commit, serious physical assaults on others.
It thereby defends the presumptive right of individuals not to be
physically assaulted or threatened with such assault. How far such
protection extends—a question which requires a closer definition of
“sexual assault”—is a question we will take up later.137
Next, it is firmly established in our judicial system that criminal
punishment is justified only if the person who causes harm is
blameworthy for doing so. Harm done to another in self-defense, or
that results from other excusable or justifiable circumstances, is not
punishable; harm done negligently—that is, without conscious
purpose, knowledge, or knowledge of risk that the harm might result
from the defendant’s conduct—is either not punishable at all, or
punishable only if the defendant’s negligence reaches beyond that
required in the civil sphere.138 And harm done without moral fault—

136. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge to Criminal Law, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2182 (1995). Professor Schulhofer effectively captures the first of
these elements in the related civil context of sexual harassment: “[I]f a supervisor
tries to get sexual favors by offering a promotion (or by threatening to veto one), he is
confronting the employee with alternatives (no matter whether we call them offers or
threats) that his position gives him no right to impose. If the supervisor used his
position to get an economic payoff from the employee, he would be guilty of extortion.
If a professor threatened to withhold a good grade or a good recommendation until he
got some cash from a student, again he would be guilty of extortion. The worker or
student should have the same right to control her sexuality that she has to control
her wages or her bank account. . . . What makes the [woman’s] consent invalid is
that rules already settled in our culture deny the supervisor the right to require an
employee to choose between her promotion and her legally protected interests. . . .
For the same reason, the high school principal who allegedly obtained sex from a
student by threatening to block her graduation should certainly be guilty of a crime.”
Id. (emphasis added).
137. See infra Part IV.A.1.
138. See, e.g., Rex v. Bateman, 133 LT 730, 732 (1925) (“In explaining to juries
the test which they should apply to determine whether the negligence, in the
particular case, amounted or did not amount to a crime, judges have used many
epithets such as ‘culpable,’ ‘criminal,’ ‘gross,’ ‘wicked,’ ‘clear,’ ‘complete.’ But,
whatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish
criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the
negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between
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strict liability harms—are limited to minor offenses or those which
fit into the well-defined category of “public-welfare” offenses.139 To be
criminally punishable, the person who inflicts a criminallyprohibited harm must, at the time they acted, have had some
culpable knowledge or very good reason to have possessed such
knowledge that the person’s conduct would cause the harm.140
Finally, the law (including criminal law) punishes only those
harms which are objectively provable. This is a reality which has
particular import for sexual crimes, which often possess the twin
characteristics of inflicting a large amount of harm on the victim
while also offering a relatively small amount of corroborative
evidence, such as testimony from third parties outside of the
recollections and accounts of the parties to the sexual encounter. The
law requires that the burden of proof be placed upon the
complainant, that the standard of proof be sufficient to convince
impartial observers that the harm happened, and that the person
charged possessed the relevant culpable mental state while
committing it.141
The principles that the law punishes only that subset of provable
harms which violate certain rights, and only when a defendant
deserves blame for doing so, apply in the context of personal
(including sexually intimate) relationships. In the commercial
sphere, the principle of open competition sets the background to
business dealings, denying John recovery when Jane harms his
business simply by making and selling cheaper widgets. In the arena
of personal relationships, the analogous default principle is that of
individual autonomy—according to which adult people are free to
decide with whom they want to be in a relationship and how they
want that relationship to be conducted.142 Within the fairly broad

subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a
crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment.”).
139. See, e.g., Richard J. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12
STAN. L. REV. 731, 732 (1960) (citing Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses,
33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 83 (1955)).
140. 1 FRANCES WHARTON ET AL., WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (14th ed.
1978).
141. Id.
142. Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 2182. Professor Schulhofer expressed:
“[W]hat if a woman does agree [to sex]? What kinds of constraints violate her
autonomy? Autonomy cannot mean freedom from all constraints upon choice, but it
does entail freedom from those constraints that our culture identifies as illegitimate.
The scope of that freedom is marked by the rights to bodily integrity and personal
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boundaries set by laws which criminalize fraud, assault, and so
forth, we allow people to run their personal lives, including their
sexual lives, in the way they see fit—even if they suffer harm in the
process. In the course of human relationships people are
(unfortunately) lied to, cheated, manipulated, insulted, and treated
badly. Relationships, in short, can be harmful. Generally, however,
we do not punish people criminally for harmful things they do in
personal relationships unless those behaviors clearly violate another
person’s physical autonomy or would constitute a crime
(embezzlement or fraud, for example) in an arms-length transaction.
The law thus creates a strong presumption against state
intervention and punishment, even in cases which indisputably
result in harm.143
Under this conception of rights, if A credibly says to B, “Have sex
with me or I’ll kill you,” and B has sex with A because of A’s threat,
A has violated B’s rights and has committed punishable sexual
assault.144 If, on the other hand, A says to B, “Have sex with me or
I’ll break up with you,” that may not be very nice of A, but it violates
no right of B’s. Outside of special status relationships such as
marriage or parenthood, B does not have the right to compel A to
have a relationship with her, to stay in that relationship, or to
acquire her consent to end it. The right lies on the other side: both A
and B have the presumptive right to leave their relationship for any

independence that existing legal principles already protect. This modest conception
of personal autonomy offers boundaries that are specific and, yet, far reaching.” Id.
143. So, for example, domestic violence laws prohibit intimate partners from
using force (or threats of force) to dominate each other in a relationship, but do not
generally prohibit them from lying to each other, saying hurtful things, being
unreasonably demanding or selfish, etc. In general, harms given and received in
relationships that are not independently criminal and do not involve special status,
physical injury, or threats of physical injury, are not criminally actionable. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 741.28(2) (2018) (“‘Domestic Violence’ means any assault, aggravated
assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking,
kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury
or death of one family or household member by another family or household
member.”).
144. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (providing that a defendant commits “rape” when he “has sexual
intercourse with a female not his wife” and “he compels her to submit by force or by
threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be
inflicted on anyone”); id. § 213.2 (providing that a defendant commits “gross sexual
imposition” when he “has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife” and “he
compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of
ordinary resolution”).

2018]

RESTORING FAIRNESS

1107

reason or no reason at all. A can leave B because B will not have sex
with A, or because A met somebody richer or prettier or smarter or
blonder or taller or shorter or heavier or lighter or . . . for any
reason. Although we might say that some of those reasons are fairly
paltry in a moral sense (good riddance to A, if he leaves B because of
them), the criminal law will not punish A for threatening to act or
for acting upon them. In such a situation, A may have harmed B in
the sense that B is now faced with the hard choice of either having
sex with A when he or she would rather not, or doing without A
entirely, which by hypothesis, B does not want to do either. However
tough that may be emotionally, and whatever moral judgments we
may be inclined to pass upon A, A has not committed a criminally
punishable offense.
Stephen Schulhofer usefully compares two cases: (1) a highly
paid fashion model who consents to sex with a casting director in
order to further her acting career, and (2) “a needy mother of four
who finds a partner willing to support her.”145 The model’s autonomy
has been violated by the director because “[t]here is an improper
constraint on the woman’s freedom of choice under background
rights that are already settled in our culture.”146 In the “hard case”
of the needy mother, on the other hand, if the man threatens to kick
her out of the house unless she continues to satisfy him sexually,
that threat may not be legally actionable:
Obviously, the needy mother has far less freedom of choice
than the successful fashion model does. But the relevant
question has to be whether the man’s threatened actions are
illicit. In the model’s situation, the pressure may be slight,
but it is clearly impermissible. In the mother’s case, the
pressure, though severe, might not be illicit. A sexual quid
pro quo is not a legitimate condition of ordinary employment,
but sexual fulfillment is, for both men and women, an
appropriate and valued goal of ongoing, intimate personal
relationships. Thus, although the man’s action in imposing a
sexual condition on his willingness to continue his
relationship with the needy mother could be criticized as
insensitive in many contexts, it nonetheless involves an
exercise of his autonomy that society ordinarily considers
legitimate and worthy of social protection. . . . [I]f existing
norms do not protect her from this sort of economic pressure,
145.
146.

Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 2183.
Id.
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then her decision to remain in the relationship, although
highly constrained, is not improperly tainted, and her
consent to sex would therefore be valid. . . . The key is in the
background structure of rights and privileges that determine
what uses of personal power and institutional position are
permissible, against either the weak or the strong, against
either men or women in our society.147
Under this conception of criminal law, a fair number of morally
egregious cases would not be criminally actionable. Suppose, for
example, that Bill and Barb are sexually involved. Barb is unhappy
and wants to end the relationship, and to prevent her from leaving,
Bill credibly threatens, “If you leave me, I will kill you.” In this case
Bill has clearly and believably threatened Barb with grave physical
harm and has thus violated her rights in a way that constitutes
criminal coercion.148 But suppose, instead, that Bill threatens, “If
you leave me, I will kill myself.” Again, most of us would make
negative moral judgments about this behavior—it is manipulative,
exploitive, etc. But in contrast to the prior example, the threat in
this second instance should not be criminally actionable. Despite the
fact that such manipulation might well cause harm to Barb (either
by preventing her from leaving the relationship or if she leaves and
Bill follows through with his threat, causing her to feel guilty for his
demise), it is a threat of harm to one’s self, not another. Thus, it
violates no legally cognizable rights (Bill has no legal right of
protection against a threat of self-harm).
In sum, the intentional infliction of harm, by itself, is not
criminally punishable. To “qualify” for punishment, the inflicted
harm must violate (or credibly threaten to violate) the harmed
person’s rights, including his or her right to personal physical
security. Clearly, a system structured in this way will leave many
harms unredressable by the law of punishment.

147.
148.

Id. at 2183–84 (third emphasis added).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1).
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D. The Principle of Parsimony
Why does the law, and in particular the criminal law, operate in
this parsimonious way? Why punish only harms that violate, or
credibly threaten to violate, a person’s physical autonomy? Why not
punish all morally egregious conduct (such as a threat to eject a
person from your house unless they have sex with you or a threat to
commit suicide if the other person leaves the relationship) if such
conduct in fact pressures a person into doing something that they
would not otherwise do? Or, perhaps we should consider the mirror
image of this question: why not adopt a much more expansive vision
of the legally defensible rights of persons in a relationship?
Shouldn’t the law recognize and enforce the widow’s right not to be
forced into a choice between sex and a safe home, and Barb’s right
not to be subjected to Bill’s manipulative threats to harm himself if
she exercises her autonomous choice to end their relationship?
Stating the question may suggest the right answer. Criminal
enforcement of morality at such a micro-level would probably be
impossible and could easily become tyrannical. We are not willing to
devote the resources or accept the degree of state intrusion that
would be necessary in order to protect people from all the emotional
harms that arise in personal relationships. In the personal arena,
the law of punishment sets broad boundaries, prohibiting physical
harms and the credible threat of such harms. Within those
boundaries the law generally leaves it to individuals to run their
own lives and defend their own autonomy.149 We punish only the
most serious harms, and in the area of personal relationships, we
generally deem those to be actual or credibly threatened harms to
the physical autonomy of the person.

149. For an interesting discussion of the traditional boundaries of criminal law
in this respect and recent attempts to change them, see generally Avlana K.
Eisenberg, Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress, 113 MICH. L. REV. 607 (2015)
(noting that criminal law traditionally has implicitly acknowledged emotional harm
but has not made such harm an element of criminal liability and arguing that recent
“Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress” statutes, which break with this tradition,
are problematic).
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E. Parsimony and Proportionality
This parsimonious definition of rights, in turn, is conceptually
parallel to the principle of proportional punishment. According to the
latter, criminal punishment must be proportional to the degree of
harm inflicted by the offense, and in the context of state-imposed
punishment, proportionality is the view that criminal “penalties
[should] be proportionate in their severity to the gravity of the
defendant’s criminal conduct.”150 The proportionality maxim was
famously articulated by Jeremy Bentham in his Principles of Penal
Law.151 In Bentham’s utilitarian view, criminal punishment is
presumptively an evil because it involves the deliberate infliction of
suffering on a convicted person.152 Because punishment is an evil it
should be minimized, by which Bentham meant that criminal
penalties should (1) not be inflicted at all unless necessary, and (2)
when necessary, should be carefully gauged by the seriousness of the
criminal’s offense.153 Of course, proportionality is also an important
element in retributive theories of punishment, which hold that a
person may not be punished to an extent that is greater than he or

150. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16
CRIME & JUST. 55, 55 (1992) (noting, also, that “[t]he principle of proportionality . . .
seems to be a basic requirement of fairness”).
151. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW (1771), reprinted in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 367, 401 (John Bowring ed., 1843); see also Alice
Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263,
276–77 (2005) (discussing Bentham’s view of proportionality as a principle in
criminal punishment).
152. BENTHAM, supra note 151, at 399, 401.
153. Id. In relevant part, Bentham articulated the rule of proportionality in
terms of constraints on both the minimum and maximum punishment allowed in the
criminal setting. Id. “Punishments may be too small or too great; and there are
reasons for not making them too small, as well as for not making them too great. . . .
[As to the need for minimums:] If, then, a man, having reaped the profit of a crime,
and undergone the punishment, finds the former more than equivalent to the latter,
he will go on offending for ever; there is nothing to restrain him. If those, also, who
behold him, reckon that the balance of gain is in favor of the delinquent, the
punishment will be useless for the purposes of example.” Id. at 399. As to the need
for maximums: “The punishment ought in no case to be more than what is necessary
to bring it into conformity with the rules here given. . . . An error on the maximum
side . . . is that to which legislators and men in general are naturally inclined:
antipathy, or a want of compassion for individuals who are represented as dangerous
and vile, pushes them onward to an undue severity. It is on this side, therefore, that
we should take the most precautions, as on this side there has been shown the greatest
disposition to err.” Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
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she deserves, with desert measured by the seriousness of the offense
he or she committed.154
The three principles of Harm, Parsimony, and Proportionality
are the basic building blocks of the criminal model of adjudication.
Part IV of this Article applies these principles in the setting of
sexual assault on campus, demonstrating their usefulness in
establishing a procedural framework for the adjudication of
individual cases. First, however, it will be important to clarify a key
distinction between two different functions of college codes of
conduct.
F. Distinguishing Aspiration from Punishment
Unlike criminal law, which mostly sketches society’s moral code
in a negative sense through prohibitions and punishments, college
codes of conduct usually have a dual function: (1) they prohibit
certain conduct and contain disciplinary procedures for code
violations; and (2) they articulate affirmative ideals—of community,
civility, and equal respect—that they seek to impart independently
of the disciplinary code. The second, affirmative function of college
codes retains a vestige of the in loco parentis role that colleges and
universities filled for many generations.155
In the realm of campus sexual misconduct codes, these two roles
have sometimes become confused, to the detriment of the
conversation about sexual assault on campus. In fact, it is important
to clearly distinguish them and to realize that the sanctioning
process that inevitably attends sexual misconduct adjudications does
not necessarily attach to the more aspirational sections of student
codes of conduct.
A major goal of college and university student conduct codes is to
articulate a set of aspirations and behavioral ideals toward which
members of the community are expected to strive. In contrast to
criminal law’s focus on prohibitions, campus codes often declare the
affirmative norms by which the community seeks to operate—norms
of mutual respect, toleration, honesty, and integrity. These norms
154. See, e.g., HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 436 (1979)
(“[T]he requirement that punishment not be disproportionately great . . . is dictated
by the same principle that does not allow punishment of the innocent, for any
punishment in excess of what is deserved for the criminal conduct is punishment
without guilt.”).
155. See generally Theodore C. Stamatakos, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis,
Tort Liability, and the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471 (1990)
(discussing the doctrine of in loco parentis in a collegiate setting).
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express the values necessary for an academic community to function
well. They also acknowledge a traditional role of the university, the
sense that part of its job is to continue the character education of
young adults as well as their academic training. Thus, college
conduct codes are replete with exhortatory statements:

• “[A]ll student members of the University community are
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that
demonstrates mutual respect for the rights and
personal/academic well-being of others, preserves the
integrity of the social and academic environment, and
supports the mission of the University.”156
• “Students at Carnegie Mellon, because they are members
of an academic community dedicated to the achievement of
excellence, are expected to meet the highest standards of
personal, ethical and moral conduct possible. These
standards require personal integrity, a commitment to
honesty without compromise, as well as truth without
equivocation and a willingness to place the good of the
community above the good of the self . . . . It is rare that the
life of a student in an academic community can be so private
that it will not affect the community as a whole or that the
above standards do not apply.”157
• “Bruins are committed to the values of Respect,
Accountability, Integrity, Service and Excellence. Bruins
conduct themselves with integrity and understand that the
quality of their educational experience is predicated on the
quality of their academic work and service to the community.
Bruins hold themselves accountable to the commitments they
make and for their conduct. When faced with adversity,
Bruins engage in thoughtful reflection and exhibit superior
ethical decision-making skills.”158
Such statements do not define specific conduct violations that
will result in punishment. No college could (or would) punish every
word or behavior by a student which does not “support the mission of

156. Academic Integrity, N.Y.U. SHANGHAI, https://shanghai.nyu.edu/content/
academic-integrity (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
157. Carnegie Mellon Code, CARNEGIE MELLON U., https://www.cmu.edu/stud
ent-affairs/theword/code/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
158. UCLA Student Conduct Code, UCLA, https://www.deanofstudents.ucla.
edu/Individual-Student-Code (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
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the university,”159 “place the good of the community above the good
of the self,”160 or demonstrate “thoughtful reflection and . . . superior
ethical decision-making skills.”161 Such exhortations are not meant
to articulate standards of formal punishment, but rather a
behavioral ideal toward which students should strive. They serve
purposes which are mainly pedagogical and developmental rather
than punitive. A university’s code of punishment—the rules
specifying misconduct which are adjudicated by college misconduct
panels—on the other hand, pertains only to a small subset of
violations, violations (prominently including sexual assault) which
are deemed to cause large and unjustified harm. The three principles
articulated above—harm, parsimony and proportionality—mark and
enforce the conceptual boundary between the realms of aspiration
and permissible punishment in campus codes of conduct.
Both the aspirational and punitive roles of student conduct codes
apply to their dictates about personal relationships—including
sexual relationships. The statement in a college code of conduct that
“[a]ll members of the University community have a right to
treatment with dignity and respect and to full participation in the
community”162 cannot reasonably be interpreted as a declaration
that any violation of that ideal—any instance of disrespect or
unfairness in personal relationships between students—will be
adjudicated and punished in a disciplinary proceeding. For the same
reason that society does not punish all harms via criminal law,
universities should not, and cannot, punish all morally flawed
behaviors which occur between students involved in personal
relationships, including intimate relationships. A student who
“cheats” on an intimate partner by flirting with someone else, or
calls an intimate partner hurtful names during a fight, or says mean
things about an intimate partner behind his or her back—all
violations of respect and fair dealing which people commit in
intimate relationships all the time—should not be subject to formal
disciplinary proceedings and sanctions for violating his or her code of
conduct.
In their critique of the “sex bureaucracy” now encircling higher
education, Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk recount some wonderful

159. Academic Integrity, supra note 156.
160. Carnegie Mellon Code, supra note 157.
161. UCLA Student Conduct Code, supra note 158.
162. Student Handbook: Standards of Conduct in the Harvard Community,
HARV. U., http://static.fas.harvard.edu/registrar/ugrad_handbook/current/chapter5/
standards_conduct.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
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examples of what they call “bureaucratic sex creep” in this area.163
They quote from a number of college and university conduct codes
which purport to teach students how to have healthy romantic and
sexual relationships.164 In 2015, for example, Georgia Southern
University instructed students: “[Sexual c]onsent is a voluntary,
sober, imaginative, enthusiastic, creative, wanted, informed, mutual,
honest, and verbal agreement.”165 The 2014 Annual Security Report
from American University outlines “the difference between healthy
and unhealthy relationships,”166 while the consent materials from
the University of Wyoming urge students, “Don’t Kill the Mood,”
explaining that “[a]sking for consent . . . shows your creativity and
can even make the sexual interaction more intimate.”167
As standards for adjudications of misconduct, such exhortations
obviously make no sense. No school would seriously entertain the
charge that a respondent should be disciplined for misconduct
because they were insufficiently “creative” or “imaginative” in
procuring consent. Such instructions are not meant to spell out
grounds for a misconduct charge but rather to teach students about
healthy relationships, especially healthy sexual relationships.168
Those who create and who implement campus codes of sexual
misconduct must recognize the distinction between the aspirational
and the punitive. Just as the principles of parsimony and
proportionality restrict criminal prohibitions to a subset of wrongful
acts, misconduct prohibitions in campus codes reach only a relatively
small set of provable, serious (and therefore punishable) harms.

163. Gersen & Suk, supra note 2, at 925–30.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 925–26 (quoting GA. S. UNIV., ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 39 (2015),
http://perma.cc./8NQF-SEQY).
166. Id. at 927 (quoting AM. UNIV., ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 31 (2014),
https://perma.cc/6GWT-RJVV).
167. Id. at 928 (quoting UNIV. OF WYO., WHERE IS YOUR LINE: CONSENT IS
SEXY, https://perma.cc/45FK-BQRQ).
168. Admittedly, some college consent materials may venture too far even as
aspirational guides. See, e.g., id. at 929 (quoting consent materials from the
University of Wyoming, in which students who want to “Make Consent Fun” are
offered “some more colorful suggestions for a script: Baby, you want to make a bunk
bed: me on top, you on bottom? May I pleasure you with my tongue? Would you like
to try an Australian kiss? It’s like a French kiss, but ‘Down Under.’ I’ve got the ship.
You’ve got the harbor. Can I dock for the night?”).
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G. Three Common Principles
Collectively, the harm, parsimony, and proportionality principles
set a baseline standard for the criminal process. In the context of
personal relationships, they instruct (1) that criminal law will not
punish all harms but only certain harms (typically those which
violate or credibly threaten to violate the physical security of other
persons); (2) that punishment, the deliberate infliction of suffering
on a convicted defendant, must be justified by legitimate purposes
(e.g., desert and/or utility) and will only be inflicted for serious
offenses that violate important rights as society understands them;
and (3) that punishment must not exceed, in nature or degree, the
just deserts of the convicted defendant as gauged, again, by the
seriousness of the crime he or she committed.169 To the extent that
the law of punishment follows these principles, we recognize it to be
just and fair. Further, the procedural rights and protections we call
“due process” in the criminal context are strategies which help to
ensure that these meta-goals of the process—that punishment be
inflicted only for the harmful violation of rights, that it not be
inflicted on the undeserving, and that it be inflicted only to the
degree deserved by the guilt of the defendant—are achieved to the
maximum extent possible.
What might be called the criminal law model of punishment in
this context is just this: the presence of these three related principles
combined with a method of balancing them which allows for charges
of sexual assault to be heard, for the person charged to have a full
and fair opportunity to mount a defense, and for the adjudication
process to thus produce accurate, transparent, and fair results. Out
of a desire to maximize accuracy and prevent unjust convictions, our
balancing method has produced certain core rules and presumptions:

• The presumption of innocence, requiring the state to
prove guilt according to clear standards—the more serious
the charge, the higher the standard of proof;
• Statutes of limitation, requiring that criminal
prosecutions for most offenses be brought within a specified
time period, based on the theory that over time key evidence
becomes lost or corrupted, witnesses disappear or forget, and
the chance of inaccurate decision-making rises accordingly;

169. With the degree of seriousness measured by the degree of harm inflicted, or
credibly threatened, to the physical autonomy of other persons.
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• Advance notice to accused defendants accompanied by a
full explanation of the charges against them;
• Clear definitions of criminal prohibitions, a way of giving
notice to the public of what conduct would render them
subject to prosecution;
• An impartial process adjudicated by trained personnel
who are thoroughly familiar with the appropriate rules and
standards;
• Transparency—both in terms of clarity of the rules and
openness of the process to the parties and, where
appropriate, to the public—so that errors can be seen and
corrected as quickly as possible.
Criminal law offers one functional model of the harm,
parsimony, and proportionality principles at work in a system of
punishment which seeks to do justice. But the model also presents a
structure and framework that can be applied to any system of
punishment. Part IV of this Article applies the framework to the
problem of adjudicating sexual assault on campus.
IV. THE MODEL APPLIED TO CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT
The foregoing does not require that every system of punishment
must precisely mirror criminal law or replicate its methods of
balancing the three principles. Setting and context matter; and the
particular procedures required may vary with differences in both.
The Supreme Court dictates that due process is necessarily a flexible
concept, sensitive to the particular situation in which the need for
protection of rights arises. Where the three core principles are
respected, and the process “due” to a defendant follows from them
and keeps them in a proper balance, a system of punishment can
consistently meet the demands of justice.
How should the balance be struck in cases of sexual misconduct
and sexual assault on campus?
A. The Criminal Law Model in Context
Recall the model’s basic conceptual framework. Its animating
principles derive from a background respect for the autonomy of the
individual person.170 Criminal punishment is justifiable only when
an offender has inflicted serious harm that violates the rights of

170.

See supra text accompanying note 142.
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others, and only to the degree merited by the gravity of the
offense.171 Further, rights in relationships are defined against a
background assumption that, absent physical harm or the threat of
such harm, people should generally be allowed to enter, conduct, and
leave personal relationships in the ways, and for the reasons, that
they choose.172
This autonomy principle argues for a vigorous response to
serious assaults on the person, such as sexual assault.173 People
have the right not to be physically forced into having sex or sexual
contact, and not to be coerced into having sex or sexual contact by
otherwise illegal means (e.g., as the price of their physical freedom,
of someone else’s physical freedom, of getting a good grade, a
promotion, or a job, or of retaining their privacy against the threat of
exposure).174 Further, if A has sex with B, knowing that B is not
consenting or is reckless with respect to B’s consent, then A has
violated B’s rights whether or not A uses or threatens to use force or
coercion, and A should be found responsible for sexual misconduct.
Punishment is permissible only when (1) the perpetrator caused
harm that violated the victim’s rights; (2) the perpetrator caused
such harm in a morally culpable way; and (3) that harm is provable
under a clearly defined standard.175
The autonomy principle also argues for the maximum possible
protection against unjust conviction and punishment and a number
of procedural rights proceed from that premise. Unjust punishment
can seriously interfere with the autonomy of the wrongly convicted
person and serves no legitimate interest of the victim. Persons
171. See supra text accompanying note 153.
172. See supra text accompanying note 142.
173. See, e.g., M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2003), in KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 186, 369, 371 (9th ed.
2012) (“The basic principle which is truly common to [the reviewed] legal systems is
that serious violations of sexual autonomy are to be penalised. Sexual autonomy is
violated wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it . . . .”
(alteration in original)).
174. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1–213.2 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed
Official Draft 1962) (discussing the definition of “rape” and “gross sexual
imposition”).
175. See, e.g., M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2003), in KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 186, 369, 372 (9th ed.
2012) (“[T]he actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by . . .
sexual penetration . . . where [it] occurs without . . . consent given voluntarily, as a
result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding
circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and
the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”).
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charged with serious offenses—offenses which carry the potential for
punishment—have the right to a fair and accurate assessment of the
evidence against them. Fair and accurate assessment, in turn,
requires that certain threshold rules be firmly in place.
1. Clearly Defined Offenses
First, the offenses at issue must be clearly, carefully, and
transparently defined so that all members of the community
understand what actions violate the sexual misconduct standard and
under what conditions the standard will apply. Thus, campus
misconduct codes must make valid distinctions between their
aspirational and punitive dimensions—neither seeking to punish
students for violating such amorphous duties as “support[ing] the
mission of the university,”176 nor withholding punishment that is
otherwise justified on the grounds that the mission of the institution
is to educate and not to punish.177
Campus sexual misconduct codes must clearly define the
meaning of “sexual harassment” under Title IX, and must also
clearly and publicly define, ex ante, the elements of sexual
misconduct offenses. In this connection, such terms as “affirmative
consent” and “incapacitation”—core elements in most of the new
campus sexual misconduct codes—should be defined so as to
explicitly mark the boundary between permissible and actionable
behavior. Too often they are not.
Serious concerns have been raised about the fairness and
accuracy of the affirmative consent standard, which is now imposed
by law on colleges and universities in California and other states.178
The strength of affirmative consent standards is that they put
sexual autonomy front and center. Stephen Schulhofer has described
this virtue well:

176. Academic Integrity, supra note 156.
177. Lombardi, supra note 132.
178. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (West 2018) (“‘Affirmative consent’
means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity.
It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he
or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual
activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean
consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can
be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship between the persons
involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be
assumed to be an indicator of consent.”).
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‘No’ means no, obviously. But an intrusion on the person
requires more than just the absence of a clear ‘no.’ A physical
intrusion on the person requires actual permission. Would
anyone think that a medical patient’s ambivalence, or an
ambiguous ‘maybe,’ was a consent to medical treatment or
surgery? Obviously, anything less than clear affirmative
permission would never count as consent. . . . Why should the
physical autonomy of a woman’s body not be entitled to the
same respect in a sexual encounter? . . . Consent for an
intimate physical intrusion into the body should mean in
sexual interactions what it means in every other context—
affirmative permission clearly signaled by words or
conduct.179
In the context of institutional punishment, however, the concerns
about affirmative consent are at least equally powerful. In relevant
part, for example, the California affirmative consent statute reads as
follows: “Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual
activity and can be revoked at any time.”180 As an aspirational ideal,
this statement has obvious value. But as a basis for punishment, it
is deeply problematic, especially in the context of a college
disciplinary proceeding that requires only a preponderance standard
to prove a violation and is conducted by personnel who typically have
little or no training in adjudication.181 The cases discussed earlier
illustrate the potential injustice of the standard.182 As a practical
matter, how is a person accused of sexual assault under an
affirmative consent standard to prove that he or she obtained
“ongoing” affirmative consent in a sexual encounter witnessed only
by the two parties to the sex? What does “ongoing” mean? That each
person must obtain consent at certain stages of their sexual

179. Schulhofer, supra note 136, at 2181. As to the details of his proposed
affirmative consent standard, and its workability, Professor Schulhofer argues:
“Clear proof of an unequivocal ‘no’ should not be required. . . . There are many ways
to make permission clear without verbalizing the word ‘yes,’ and permission
certainly need not be in writing. But permission must be an affirmative indication of
actual willingness. Silence and ambivalence are not permission.” Id.
180. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386.
181. See id. (All California institutions of higher education, in order to receive
state funds for student financial assistance, “shall adopt a policy concerning sexual
assault . . . . The policy shall include . . . [a] policy that the standard used in
determining whether the elements of the complaint against the accused have been
demonstrated is the preponderance of the evidence.”).
182. See supra Part II.A.3.
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encounter? If so, what stages are those? What constitutes
“revocation” of consent? Certainly, a verbal “no” should be enough,
but affirmative consent statutes do not require this. Does the
affirmative consent statute upend the presumption of innocence that
forces the party bringing the charge to prove the case against the
accused? Some believe that it does—that the standard, in effect,
mandates a finding of sexual assault unless the accused can prove
that he or she obtained ongoing consent in whatever way that term
is defined by the adjudicator.183 Until these questions are answered,
it will be at least unclear whether the standard accurately targets
only parties who have violated the sexual rights of other persons or
whether, instead, it has made a lot of non-actionable conduct subject
to serious disciplinary action and punishment.
Similar problems attend the definition of “incapacitation,” and
its relationship to “consent,” in many college codes. It is clearly
appropriate for a system of punishment to prohibit sexual contact
with a person who is “incapacitated” because he or she was sleeping
or unconscious at the time of the contact.184 The Codes often go well
beyond that, however, enabling charges of sexual misconduct when
one or both parties may be intoxicated but still able to walk, speak
coherently, etc. and leaving it to misconduct panels in individual
cases to decide, ex post and (again) under the lowest possible
standard of proof, what “incapacitation” really means.185 It is true

183. See, e.g., Alan Dershowitz, Innocent Until Proven Guilty? Not Under ‘Yes
Means Yes.’, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/intheory/wp/2015/10/14/how-affirmative-consent-rules-put-principles-of-fairness-atrisk/ (opposing college affirmative consent standard on ground of fairness to the
accused; “it is better for [ten] individuals who did not obtain consent to go free than
for even one individual who did obtain consent to be wrongfully punished. Being
wrongfully punished can be catastrophic for a student.”). Here, Dershowitz also
delineates the important difference between the aspiration and punitive aspects of
college conduct codes: “I believe that there are two separate, often overlapping,
issues with regard to consent. One involves individual behavior, an area in which
affirmative consent could be a helpful standard. The second, however, concerns our
legal system—where punishing alleged violations of such stringent rules without due
process may tarnish our principles of fairness.” Id. On the first (aspirational) side,
Dershowitz approves of the affirmative consent standard; on the second (legal) side,
he opposes the affirmative consent standard on the grounds that punishing someone
under it is unfair to the accused person. Id.
184. See, e.g., Liam Stack, Outrage Over Sentencing in Rape Case at Stanford,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2016, at A15 (describing facts of the case and the controversy
surrounding Brock Turner’s sentence).
185. See, e.g., T. Rees Shapiro, He Said It Was Consensual. She Said She
Blacked Out. U-Va. Had to Decide: Was It Assault?, WASH. POST (July 14, 2016),
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that many codes contain a reasonableness provision under which the
accused may defend against a charge of sexual assault on the
grounds that he or she reasonably believed that the other person
was not incapacitated. But what counts as “reasonable” or
“unreasonable” behavior in these circumstances, particularly when
the definitions of “consent” and “incapacitation” may be murky, is far
from clear.186 Adjudicators require some discretion in applying
general standards to a particular set of facts. But to achieve a
procedural standard which honors the principles of harm,
parsimony, and proportionality, much more guidance is needed as to
what the standard and its component parts mean.
2. Threshold Procedural Protections
In addition to clearly defined offenses, fairness and accuracy
require the presence of procedural protections for the accused. The
need for procedural rights is proportionally related to two things: (1)
the seriousness of the charged offense and (2) the risk of false
conviction.
Above, I discussed the relationship between a defendant’s
procedural rights and the gravity of the offense.187 The more serious
the latter, the more potentially harsh the punishment, and therefore
the more compelling the need for procedural rights that ensure the
defendant has a full and fair chance to argue his or her case.
As for the risks of inaccurate adjudication, four seem most
serious in the context of campus adjudication of sexual assault: (1)
OCR’s mandate that colleges must use the lowest standard of proof
(preponderance of the evidence) in deciding these often complicated
and confusing cases; (2) the lack of rules (on many campuses)
surrounding notice, and ex ante access to the evidence, for the person
charged; (3) the adjudication of such cases by untrained faculty,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ education/he-said-it-was-consensual-she-wasblacked-out-u-va-had-to-decide-was-it-assault/2016/07/14/4211a758-275c-11e6-ae4a3cdd5fe74204_story.html?hpid=hp_rhp-top-table-main_uva-335pm%3Ahomepage%2
Fstory (describing a case in which the core issue was whether or not (under the
university’s standard) the victim was incapacitated by alcohol at the time of the
sexual encounter; “To U-Va.,” wrote author Shapiro, “it was another drunken mess
with no good answers.”).
186. See, e.g., Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7,
2014,
11:53
AM),
www.slate.com/articles/double_x/2014/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assault
(recounting the 2013 case of “John Doe” at Occidental College).
187. See supra text accompanying note 154.
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administrators, students, or Title IX administrators, who, in some
cases, are charged with the investigation and adjudication of these
cases despite the potential conflict of interest between their duty to
be impartial in each case and their role as enforcer of OCR’s Title IX
interpretations; and (4) the greatly constricted roles of
representatives for the accused and complainant—for example
barring them from questioning or cross-examining witnesses for the
other side.
It seems clear that the risk of false findings of liability is much
greater in this context than it is even in civil court, where these
procedural deficits do not exist in nearly the same degree. Feminist
Judge and Law Professor Nancy Gertner has expressed the point
well:
What was troubling to me [about the new sexual misconduct
procedures at Harvard] was not the [preponderance]
standard in and of itself. It was that standard accompanied
by considerably fewer protections. In civil court, civil rights
cases and sexual harassment cases are all evaluated by a
“fair preponderance” standard. But those proceedings take
place after discovery—people have exchanged information;
after lawyers; after hearings presided over by a judge. What
was troubling at Harvard . . . was . . . a preponderance
standard unaccompanied by any of those proceedings: no
counselors for both sides, no hearing—no setting in which the
accuser had to say what was going on and could be addressed
by lawyers, even if not by the man accused.188
The need for procedural protections in campus-based cases of
sexual assault where the charged respondent faces the most serious
possible institutional sanctions—expulsion and/or permanent
notation of the offense and liability finding on his or her transcript—
is at its highest. At a minimum, such protections must include:

• Complete, written notice of the charges against him or
her, in advance of any investigation or adjudication.
• Advance access to all the evidence obtained during the
investigation. Only when an accused person has a full
understanding of the charges and the evidence can he or she
adequately prepare a defense.

188.

The Toughest Issue on (Any) Campus, supra note 121.
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• The right to a formal hearing, adjudicated by impartial
and well-trained professionals, at which the respondent and
complainant may be represented by attorneys or other
professionally trained persons of his or her choice.189
• Acknowledgement of the need for structural separation
between investigators, adjudicators, and appellate authorities
involved in these cases. Separation of roles and powers
decreases the chance that bias and partiality will determine
the outcome of a case. Thus, the many college misconduct
codes which now allow investigators to recommend, or
presumptively determine, liability are not valid.190 Nor are
systems which house the investigative and adjudicative roles
under the authority of the Title IX administrator. Structural
separation allows for independent judgment, and
independent judgment greatly assists accuracy, fairness, and
the perception of fairness.
• Permission for the parties to view the evidence well in
advance, to ask questions, and to cross-examine witnesses at
the required hearing.191
• A full account, in writing, of the basis for the
adjudicator’s decision as to liability. Such decision must

189. Many conduct codes specify, as does OCR’s April 2011 Dear Colleague
letter, that adjudicators in these cases must be “trained.” See, e.g., DEAR COLLEAGUE
LETTER, supra note 8, at 8. What that means, however, is often unclear—especially
since the standards almost always specify that representation by an attorney is not
required. “All persons involved in implementing a recipient’s grievance procedures
(e.g., Title IX coordinators, investigators, and adjudicators) must have training or
experience in handling complaints of sexual harassment and sexual violence, and in
the recipient’s grievance procedures. The training also should include applicable
confidentiality requirements. In sexual violence cases, the fact-finder and decisionmaker also should have adequate training or knowledge regarding sexual violence.”
Id. Schools should be transparent on the issue of how much training they offer to
those who investigate cases and adjudicate the complicated procedural and
evidentiary issues which are sometimes involved.
190. See, e.g., Student Handbook: Standards of Conduct in the Harvard
Community, supra note 162 (stating that the Title IX Office appoints investigator
who in turn makes recommendation in final report).
191. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, 28 Harvard Law Professors Condemn Harvard’s
New Sexual Harassment Policy and Procedures, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/15/28 (reprinting a
letter by twenty-eight Harvard Law professors protesting the new sexual misconduct
procedures at Harvard on the grounds that those procedures—which, among other
changes, put the Title IX Coordinator in charge of the investigation and adjudication
process—violate due process).
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summarize the pertinent evidence, articulate the reasons for
the decision, and locate those reasons within the school’s
sexual misconduct policy and standard of liability.
• The right to appeal the initial decision on any reasonable
ground of evidentiary insufficiency, lack of impartiality, or
failure to base the decision upon the policy or publicly
available procedures.
• Finally, the burden of proof should be raised to clear and
convincing evidence, at least in cases where a finding of
liability could result in the most serious punishment—
punishment that could permanently limit or destroy the
respondent’s opportunity to complete their education. Such a
move is permissible under U.S. Supreme Court precedent
and seems indicated where serious harm to a defendant’s
reputation or other important interests may result from a
finding of liability.192 As the four cases discussed earlier in
this Article illustrate, these threshold rights are not yet
acknowledged requirements in college and university sexual
misconduct codes. They must be, and soon.
3. Victims’ Rights
People possess the right not to be sexually assaulted, and
institutional authorities should protect and defend that right.193 On
campus there are many ways of honoring these important rights,
including aspirational policies that clearly define what respectful
behavior toward others is and educate students about it—both in
sexual contexts and otherwise.194 In adjudication that threatens
punishment against a named offender, however, the criminal law
model permits only those procedural victims’ rights which (1) aid the
truth-finding function of the adjudication and (2) do not

192. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (noting that the highest
civil standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is available in cases “involving
allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant[,
because t]he interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than
mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s
burden of proof”).
193. See supra Part III.C.
194. Such education has become a major focus of campus student misconduct
codes, and that is a positive step forward. See generally Silbaugh, supra note 52
(making the case that this aspirational and pedagogical role of campus codes should
be acknowledged and expanded).
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substantially diminish the importance or the effectiveness of the
procedural rights accorded to the person who faces punishment if
found responsible.195 Victims do not have a “right” that the person
they accuse be unjustly found liable or unfairly sanctioned. It serves
no one’s interests, including the interests of victims, when cases
against accused perpetrators are rushed to judgment or decided
under vague, poorly defined standards or biased personnel, or when
adjudicatory procedures are perceived by the community and/or
general public to be biased and unfair. Only impartial and accuracyfocused adjudications, featuring carefully defined offenses, strong
procedural protections for the accused, and proportional sanctions,
serve the legitimate interests of victims.
4. Punishment that Fits the Offense
Offenders who are legitimately found liable for sexual assault
should be sanctioned. Few would argue that a student who
perpetrates a violent sexual assault on another student or has sex
with an unconscious student should not be expelled from the
institution. Yet confusion reigns here, and those who frame and
enforce campus sexual misconduct codes must clear it up.
The confusion seems to have two sources. One is definitional,
arising from sloppy analogizing to criminal law even from those who
are otherwise skeptical of its ability to prosecute sexual misconduct
cases. Demanding that colleges treat sexual assault as a “violent
felony”196 is simply incoherent; colleges do not adjudicate or punish
crimes. Similarly, speaking of a campus sexual assault as “rape”197 is
a category error; rape is a crime and is adjudicated by criminal
courts. If these statements simply urge that violent sexual assault be
treated seriously and that when a person is found responsible for it
by a legitimate adjudication process he or she should receive the
most serious punishment that the university can impose, this could
accord with the principles of the criminal law model, but only if the

195. Many of the rights now typically accorded to complainants in sexual
misconduct cases would presumably be permitted under this standard, including, for
example, complainants’ rights to equal representation at a hearing, equal access to
the evidence uncovered by investigators, a full account of the decision in the case and
its rationale, and to appeal an unfavorable decision.
196. Hart, supra note 120 (“[T]he senator’s message was loud and clear: sexual
assault is not okay and will not be tolerated. ‘We need to define this crime for the
crime that it is,’ she said. ‘Rape is a felony. It is a violent felony.’”).
197. See, e.g., Joe Drape & Marc Tracy, Protests Overshadow A Championship
at Yale, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2016, at B10.
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offenses in question are properly defined and the sanctions carefully
gauged to fit the offense. On both of these fronts, many campus
codes are heading in the wrong direction.
Reformists argue that in the past, even when a respondent has
been found guilty of sexual assault in a campus adjudication,
colleges and universities have been reluctant to impose serious
sanctions.198 In some cases, that is correct.199 But in the current,
punitive environment, it has been claimed that expulsion should be
the default sanction in all cases where a respondent is found to have
committed sexual misconduct against another student.200
That cannot be right. Both in the criminal system and in college
codes, sexual misconduct typically covers a wide variety of behaviors
ranging from “unwanted touching,” to “unwelcome sexual contact,”
to forcible intercourse.201 For sentencing purposes, no criminal code
treats a conviction for unwanted touching or unwelcome contact with
the same severity as it treats rape.202 To do so would grossly violate

198. See, e.g. Walt Bogdanich, A Star Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape
Investigation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2014/04/16/sports/errors-in-inquiry-on-rape-allegations-against-fsu-jame
is-winston.html. Bogdanich’s article raised questions about Florida State
University’s failure to investigate sexual assault allegations against its star football
player Jameis Winston until after football season ended: “The athletic department
had known early on that Mr. Winston had been accused of a serious crime. . . . This
knowledge should have set off an inquiry by the university.” Id. “According to federal
rules, any athletic department official who learns of possible sexual misconduct is
required to pass it on to school administrators.” Id. “‘Why did the school not even
attempt to investigate the matter until after the football season?’ said John Clune,
another lawyer for the accuser.” Id. Bogdanich’s article also quoted from an interview
with former Florida prosecutor Adam Ruiz. Id. Discussing a sexual assault allegation
at F.S.U. that he had prosecuted a decade before the Jameis Winston case, Mr. Ruiz
told The New York Times: “I learned quickly what football meant in the South . . . .
Clearly, it meant a lot. And with respect to this case I learned that keeping players
on the field was a priority.” Id.
199. See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, Fewer Than One-Third of Campus Sexual
Assault Cases Result in Expulsion, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:59 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/29/campus-sexual-assault_n_5888742.html
(finding that fewer than one-third of cases in which respondents are found
responsible for sexual misconduct result in expulsion).
200. See, e.g., New, supra note 24.
201. See, e.g., Student Handbook: Standards of Conduct in the Harvard
Community, supra note 162.
202. The Model Penal Code, for example, contains a number of sexual assault
offenses graded by severity: rape, gross sexual imposition, deviate sexual intercourse
(by force or imposition), corruption of minors, sexual assault, and indecent exposure.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0–213.5 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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the proportionality principle. Unwanted touching and the like may
properly be deemed offenses, but they are not as serious, and
therefore should not be treated as harshly, as forced intercourse. The
punishment for sexual misconduct and sexual assault on campus
should closely track the criminal law model in this sense: while the
sanctions available to college misconduct panels are different from
those available to courts, the severity of punishment should follow a
similarly proportional course. That is, nonconsensual intercourse
should be punished most severely—expulsion and a permanent
transcript notation seem quite fair in that context. Unwelcome
sexual contact that does not involve intercourse should be punished
less severely and so forth. Thus, colleges and universities must (1)
carefully define each degree of offense and (2) carefully gauge the
sanctions available to fit the gravity of the offense. The policies and
procedures must give firm, clear guidance about the range of
sanctions to adjudicators (and other personnel who, under current
codes, may be involved in deciding responsibility and punishment or
upholding them on appeal).
B. Answering the Three Questions
This Article opened by posing three questions: (1) What harms
may be prohibited by sexual misconduct codes? (2) What procedural
rules and protections are required for adjudications under these
codes? and (3) What sanctions are permissible when someone has
been found responsible for violating the codes? Recognizing that
some discretion must remain with adjudicators deciding individual
cases, the criminal law model, when applied to the context of sexual
assault on campus, suggests sound answers to all three questions.
First, the question of prohibited harms. Student conduct codes must
distinguish between those standards which are meant to be
aspirational and to which students will be introduced by means of
education, and those which articulate prohibitions that are
punishable. Sexual misconduct codes—which contain the punishable
prohibitions regarding sexual behavior—should carefully define
offenses according to the rule that only harms which violate the
rights of another person shall be the proper basis of a misconduct
claim. Thus, the student who complains that he or she was
manipulated into having sex with another student by the other’s

The Code’s general approach to the law of sexual assault has been widely criticized,
but in this particular respect it reflects a general trend among post-1960s reformed
rape statutes. Id.
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threat to break off the relationship should not have a valid basis for
bringing a charge under a properly constituted conduct code.
The principle of personal freedom and autonomy in relationships
also requires that such freedom and autonomy not be threatened or
taken away except for good cause, proven under a rigorous standard
by fair, professional, and impartial investigators and adjudicators.
Many misconduct codes contain this language,203 but few articulate
what terms like “well-trained,” “fair,” and “impartial” mean or how
they ensure that those values are honored in the code. Colleges and
universities must be more precise and more transparent about how
they plan to achieve these important goals.
Fair and accurate adjudication, in this context, requires the
inclusion of procedural rights that are currently not honored by
many institutions—for example, the right to advance notice of the
charges, to full access to the evidence, to impartial and well-trained
adjudicators, to a separation of powers between the functions of
investigation, adjudication, appeal, and representation, and to a
reasoned account of findings and justification of any sanction.
Finally, proportional sanctioning means that the punishment
must fit the offense: colleges and universities must adopt clear and
defensible sanction regimes that prohibit them from either refusing
to sanction a student who has been found responsible (because, for
example, he is a star athlete at the school) or sanctioning a student
too harshly. For example, violent sexual assault and sexual assault
on someone who is unconscious merit serious punishments like
expulsion; lesser forms of sexual contact, even if unwanted, do not.
Colleges and universities must make clear to the public, and to the
personnel who investigate and adjudicate the cases, exactly what
constitutes an offense under the code and what range of sanctions
the offense could trigger if the person charged is found liable.
C. The DOE’s Proposal Would Restore Fundamental Fairness
Under the standard developed here, the DOE’s proposed reforms
would restore fairness to the process of adjudicating sexual assault
on campus. In particular, the DOE’s proposed regulation would
require school-recipients to offer advance written notice of the
allegations and of the school’s procedures as well as possible
sanctions and supportive measures,204 to give both parties equal

203.
204.

See, e.g., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8.
DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 48.

2018]

RESTORING FAIRNESS

1129

access to all relevant evidence obtained during the investigation,205
to hold a live, formal hearing, staffed by impartial adjudicators,206 to
permit cross-examination of witnesses, including the parties, at such
hearing,207 to separate the Title IX coordinating function from the
functions of investigating and adjudicating complaints,208 and to
offer a written account of the basis for the final decision as to
responsibility.209 The DOE’s proposal would also define “sexual
harassment” in a way that clearly connects that offense to recipients’
duties under Title IX, authorizing complaints under the statute
when “unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex . . . is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person
equal access to the recipient’s [school’s] education program or
activity.”210 Finally, although the proposed regulation would not
mandate that schools apply the clear and convincing evidence
standard in sexual harassment cases, it erases the prior requirement
to use the preponderance standard, and restricts the use of
preponderance to cases in which the school also uses that standard
to adjudicate other types of misconduct potentially carrying the
same conduct or involving the school’s employees, including
faculty.211
The proposed regulation is not perfect. Among the early concerns
expressed by commentators, at least two merit further thought.
First, the proposal restricts the availability of Title IX sexual
harassment process to acts which occur “in an education program or
activity of the recipient.”212 Some commentators have read this to
mean that harassment which occurs off campus, for example at a
fraternity party or other school-affiliated event, would not be
actionable.213 The DOE should amend this provision to make clear
that harassment at school-sponsored or affiliated events or sites,

205. Id. at 48.
206. Id. at 41, 52.
207. Id. at 52.
208. Id. at 65.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 18.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Marcotte, supra note 22 (Under the proposed rules, “a student
who is raped by another student while off campus will have no recourse with the
school.”); Rosenthal, supra note 22 (“The proposed regulations would also limit the
scope of institutional responsibility to incidents that take place ‘within a recipient’s
education program or activity,’ even if the accused is a student. This excludes many
aspects of student life, including fraternities and off-campus residences.”).
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even if those sites are technically off campus, could be the basis for
valid complaints under Title IX.
Second, the proposal allows (but does not require) schoolrecipients to offer an appeal, and provides that “[i]f a recipient offers
an appeal, it must allow both parties to appeal.”214 Some
commentators worry that allowing complainants to appeal would
subject respondents to the equivalent of double jeopardy, a risk that
is prohibited in the criminal setting by the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.215 While college and university misconduct panels are
not explicitly governed by this constitutional ban, the theory
developed here—that in the name of procedural fairness, schools
should follow the core principles which have generated the rules of
criminal punishment—suggests that respondents, at least, should be
allowed to appeal. As for the double-jeopardy analogy, the proposed
regulation states: “[A]lthough a complainant may appeal on the
ground that the remedies are not designed to restore or preserve the
complainant’s access to the recipient’s [school’s] education program
or activity, a complainant is not entitled to a particular sanction
against the respondent.”216 Thus far the DOE’s explanation of these
provisions217 is not entirely satisfying. It is true, as the DOE
suggests,218 that both complainants and respondents have important
interests in fair and accurate adjudication of these cases. Of course
the same is true in the criminal context—both complainant and
defendant have important interests in the outcome. The rationale
behind the rule against double jeopardy is not that complainants
lack important interests, but that it is unfair to repeatedly put
defendants through the stress of trial under threat of serious
punishment. If double jeopardy did not exist, the state could simply
appeal adverse verdicts until it got a conviction.
The same fundamental rationale exists here: Respondents in a
sexual harassment proceeding should not be subjected to retrial
simply because a complainant does not like the recipient’s finding or
the penalty. At the same time, unlike the criminal context,
“remedies provided by the recipient to the complainant . . . to restore
214. DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 67.
215. U.S. CONST., amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); see, e.g., Susan Kruth, supra
note 21 (“[T]he proposed regulations allow for complainants to appeal cases decided
in favor of respondents, subjecting respondents to a situation akin to double
jeopardy.”).
216. DOE Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 67.
217. Id. at 67–69.
218. Id. at 69.
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or preserve access” to the school’s educational activities may include
actions whose purpose is unrelated to punishing the respondent. If
the regulation is interpreted to mean that complainants may not
appeal for the purpose of changing a finding of non-liability or of
increasing the respondent’s punishment but may appeal for other
purposes (more directly related to the adequacy of remedies to
restore complainant’s access to education), then it might satisfy
concerns about “double jeopardy.” The DOE should (1) require
school-recipients to grant the right of appeal in sex harassment
cases and (2) further elucidate the grounds for such appeal by
respondents and complainants.
V. DOWNSIZING FAIR PROCESS
The cases discussed in this Article could not happen at every
American college or university today, but neither are they isolated
examples. They are not exceptions to the trend; they exemplify it.
Across the country, newly minted procedures for adjudicating sexual
misconduct on campus now threaten accused persons with serious
punishment under the lowest possible standard of proof, refuse to
give accused respondents adequate notice of the charges against
them, bar advocates for the parties from speaking during
adjudicatory proceedings or testing the evidence of the opposing side
by questioning witnesses, ignore clear conflicts of interest, and insist
on a degree of secrecy which insulates campus process from salutary
public scrutiny.
Proponents of the new standards argue that because college
conduct codes are not “law,” they need not be constrained by the
standards which govern legal process.219 Obviously college codes are
not “legal” in a formal sense (that is, they are not created or
implemented by legislatures and courts).220 But the absence of

219. See, e.g., Why Schools Handle Sexual Violence Reports, KNOW YOUR IX,
http://knowyourix.org/why-schools-handle-sexual-violence-reports (last visited Nov.
19, 2018) (“Title IX doesn’t take sexual violence away from the criminal justice
system; it just gives students additional rights because equality in education is so
important.”).
220. Legislatures and courts are increasingly becoming part of the discussion by,
for example, defining key terms like what it means to “consent” to sex. See, e.g., CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 67386 (West 2018) (statute mandating that institutions of higher
learning adopt affirmative consent rule when adjudicating cases of sexual assault);
see also Campus Accountability and Safety Act, S. 590, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/590/text (a proposed federal
statute, sponsored primarily by Democrats, addressing the problem of sexual assault
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formal legal status does not absolve colleges from their obligation to
do justice for the parties whose fate they adjudicate. We do not
concern ourselves with fair process only because statutes—or even
constitutional doctrine—force us to do so. We concern ourselves with
procedural fairness because it is a moral imperative when we
consciously threaten someone with punishment. In the context of
sexual misconduct, fairness means ensuring that victims’ claims of
harm have a full chance to be heard, and that persons accused of
inflicting such harm have a full opportunity to argue their
innocence, and test the case of their accuser, before an impartial
adjudicator. Harvard Law School Professor Janet Halley recently
captured this intuition:
Thing number one: We want to have workplaces and
educational settings where sexual abuse is absent. . . . Thing
number two: When we’re charging somebody with a violation
of norms that are morally and legally important, we need to
understand that we are bringing a major accusation against
them, one that can destroy their career, their peace of mind,
and their reputation. And three, we need to remember that
the legitimacy of the sex-harassment system will be
squandered if we don’t try to do both.221
The duty to deliver accurate, fair, and impartial results is not
exclusive to the law; it goes first to principles which justify and
sustain the law. College adjudicators are not deciding “legal” cases
per se, but in the campus setting, they are deciding whether or not to
inflict punishment on the accused person before them. Where a
finding of responsibility can visit serious punishment on an offender,
colleges have a primary and indefeasible obligation to deliver justice.

on campus); Safe Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3403/text (a proposed federal
statute, sponsored primarily by Republicans, addressing the same); Grace Erard,
Virginia Legislature Passes Bills to Address Campus Sexual Assault, CAVALIER
DAILY (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.cavalierdaily.com/article/2015/03/virginialegislature-passes-bills-affecting-victim-autonomy (discussing Virginia’s statutory
approach to campus sexual assault); Susan Svrluga, Do Students Get a Fair
Hearing? An Effort to Change How Colleges Handle Sexual Assaults, WASH. POST
(July
29,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2015/07/29/do-students-get-a-fair-hearing-an-effort-to-change-how-collegeshandle-sexual-assaults/ (discussing federal legislative efforts to address the
problem).
221. Dorment, supra note 76.
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Proponents argue that because colleges are not empowered to
inflict criminal-type punishments—namely, imprisonment—upon
persons found responsible for sexual misconduct on campus,
procedural safeguards are not as important in the campus setting as
they are in the criminal one.222 But this argument misses the point.
The question is not whether punishment in one sphere is identical to
punishment in the other, but rather the degree to which sanctions
available to adjudicators might seriously impact the person found
“guilty” within the sphere in which those sanctions operate.
The fact that colleges cannot deprive responsible parties of their
liberty, as the criminal system often does, might justify some
differences in adjudicatory process. The level of required procedural
rights depends on the severity of the potential sanction. For
example, if the most serious sanction available for committing
sexual misconduct on campus were a $5.00 ticket, a low level of
procedural protection for accused persons might be justified. But no
one thinks that this is, or should be, the case. A person who commits
a sexual assault should be severely punished, and the new sexual
misconduct codes reflect that belief.223 But many colleges and
universities, while lowering the procedural protections available to
accused students, have simultaneously raised the level of
punishment for persons found responsible for sexual misconduct.224
This is what raises fairness concerns about the new misconduct
codes.
“The idea that what we’re talking about here is just a civil
sanction, the equivalent of money damages, is unreal to me,” says
Professor Janet Halley.225 “When we expel or suspend a student and
put that on the transcript, it’s going to be very hard for that person
222. See, e.g., Lombardi, supra note 132 (“Administrators stress that the college
judicial system is, as IU’s Freeman, who heads the Office of Student Ethics, says,
‘not the same thing as a court of law.’ Unlike criminal courts, which enforce rape
statutes, college proceedings enforce ‘conduct codes’ that list prohibited acts like
‘sexual assault’ or ‘sexual contact.’”).
223. I should note, again, that this was not always the case. See, e.g., Dorment,
supra note 76 (recalling that “Occidental, for its part, once assigned a book report to
a student found responsible for sexual assault”); see also Bogdanich, supra note 26
(raising questions about Florida State University’s handling of sexual assault
allegation against star F.S.U. athlete Jameis Winston).
224. See, e.g., Beth Howard, How Colleges Are Battling Sexual Violence, U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Aug.
28,
2015,
2:58
PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/28/how-colleges-are-battling-sexualviolence (“A growing number of schools are also stiffening penalties for offenders. At
Duke, for example, expulsion is now the favored sanction.”).
225. Dorment, supra note 76.
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to go to any other institution of higher education.”226 In the sphere of
higher education, expulsion is the most severe punishment
available. Where expulsion is a possible sanction, the cost of
punishing an innocent respondent is at its highest and, therefore,
procedural protections of the accused should be at their most
rigorous.
A third argument for dropping procedural protections in campus
sexual assault cases points to the special evil of sexual assault, the
harms it inflicts on victims, or both. The suggestion is that we must
revamp the campus adjudication system in order to ensure that
more perpetrators are reported and punished, even if fewer
procedural protections raise the risk that innocent respondents will
be found responsible and (unjustly) sanctioned. Here, discussion
typically focuses on the clear and present danger posed by serial
campus predators,227 the ubiquity of “rape culture” and its
consequences,228 and the traumatic and enduring injury suffered by
many victims of sexual assault.229
It is of course no justification of unjust procedures to say that
many (or even most) of the people charged under them are in fact
guilty of the charge. That assertion may be true, but it is also beside
the point. We do not accord rights to accused persons because we
think they all are innocent of the crimes with they are charged. In
law we accord such rights because we deem them necessary to a fair
and accurate outcome. Even in cases where the prosecution’s
evidence seems overwhelming, defendants deserve a fair chance to
defend themselves and to test the evidence of their accusers.230
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, What If Most Campus Rapes Aren’t
Committed
By
Serial
Rapists?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(July
13,
2015),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-if-most-campus-rapes-arent-committed-byserial-rapists/.
228. See, e.g., Tyler Bishop, The Laws Targeting Campus Rape Culture,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/09/
the-laws-targeting-campus-rape-culture/404824/. See generally College Rape Culture,
HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/topic/college-rape-culture (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018) (a collection of articles discussing college rape culture).
229. See, e.g., Sexual Assault on Campus, NAT’L INST. JUST.,
https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexual-violence/campus/Pages/welcome.aspx
(last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (“Sexual assault can have devastating effects that can
last a lifetime.”).
230. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–44 (1966); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (holding that the right of an indigent criminal
defendant to an attorney is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial”). In order to
introduce the confession of a suspect obtained during a police interrogation, the state
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Again, everyone agrees that sexual assault should be punished.
To the extent that colleges and universities are suppressing reports
of sexual misconduct or letting perpetrators off lightly in order to
further institutional interests such as maintaining a good reputation
for campus safety, that behavior must be stopped.231 But punishing
bad guys is not the only goal here. If it were, then colleges could
accomplish that goal simply by finding all accused perpetrators
responsible and expelling them. Why bother with investigating at
all? And why allow any sanctions less serious than expulsion? If all
reports were simply accepted as true and the accused respondents
immediately expelled, then the guilty parties would be punished
automatically. Such a system would also greatly increase the
incentive to report, since complainants who did so would know from
the start that their case is won. We avoid this approach for the
simple reason that it would be unfair to strike the balance between
the interests of reporting and responding parties so heavily in favor
of the former. We seek a different balance, one which recognizes the
interests of the accused in addition to that of the victim. The law,

must demonstrate that the suspect has been warned that he or she has the right to
remain silent; that anything he or she does say may be used against her in court; and
that he or she has the right to an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442–44. These
“procedural safeguards” are necessary to “secure the [Fifth Amendment’s] privilege
against self-incrimination,” Id. at 444, which “had its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which
[have] long obtained in the continental system . . . . While the admissions or
confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked
high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain
his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the
questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press
the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in
many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and
Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for
its total abolition.” Id. at 442–43.
231. Whether accurate or not, the perception that colleges and universities act
in this way is widespread. See, e.g., Brooks Barnes, An Unblinking Look at Sexual
Assaults on Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2015, at C1 (discussing the content of, and
the reaction to, the film “The Hunting Ground”); Christina Cauterucci, “Don’t Accept
Rape” Campaign Uses Acceptance Letters with a Dark Twist to Fight Campus Rape
Culture, SLATE (Apr. 18, 2016, 1:24 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/
2016/04/18/don_t_accept_rape_campaign_uses_dark_acceptance_letters_to_fight_ca
mpus.html; Tyler Kingkade, Two New Documentaries Will Highlight Student
Activism Against Campus Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/21/campus-rape-documentaries_n_65178
40.html (discussing the films “The Hunting Ground” and “It Happened Here”).
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especially criminal law, offers an inevitable frame of reference.
Whether conducted on campus or in court, the integrity of an
adjudication process requires that the system secure both parties’
procedural rights. This, according to many observers, is exactly what
the new campus codes fail to do. Discussing Harvard’s revamped
procedure for adjudicating sexual misconduct cases, Professor Halley
told Esquire magazine:
Every legal lever has been ticked in the direction of the
accuser and against the [accused] . . . . I think it’s almost in
bad faith to be arguing that we ‘need’ [the preponderance
standard] because we have to get equality of the parties. It’s
called going too far.232
However flawed the above arguments are, they have thus far
fueled the creation of university sexual misconduct procedures that
raise the potential level of punishment for many campus sex offenses
while simultaneously lowering the procedural standard for assessing
responsibility. In place of a high standard of proof (for example,
beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal setting and clear and
convincing evidence on the civil side), colleges, following the
guidance of OCR, are using the lowest possible standard,
preponderance of the evidence. Instead of allowing lawyers to
participate in a process governed by strict rules of evidence, colleges
and universities assign college faculty and administrators, whose
legal training is negligible at best, to assist both parties. Parties who
do hire attorneys as advocates usually find—again, in accordance
with strictures laid down by OCR—that the attorneys are not
permitted to voice objections, question witnesses, or even to ask
232. Dorment, supra note 76. The fact that college misconduct proceedings are
“civil” rather than “criminal” does not mandate the preponderance standard. In
Addington v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court noted that the highest civil
standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is available in cases “involving
allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant[,
because t]he interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than
mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s
burden of proof.” 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). In its widely disseminated Dear Colleague
letter of April 2011, OCR considered, and rejected, the clear and convincing evidence
standard as applied to campus sexual misconduct proceedings under Title IX. See
DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 8 (“Grievance procedures that use this higher
standard [of clear and convincing evidence] are inconsistent with the standard of
proof established for violations of the civil rights laws, and are thus not equitable
under Title IX.”).
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questions during meetings with college investigators or adjudication
proceedings.233 Instead of a full hearing run by impartial judges,
many policies have transformed the adjudicatory process into a civil
investigation that is supervised and controlled by a Title IX
administrator whose mandate—to respond to the perceived crisis of
sexual assault by taking a tougher stand toward accused
perpetrators—presents an obvious conflict of interest that threatens
the fairness and impartiality of these adjudications. It is no wonder
that students found responsible under the new sexual misconduct
procedures are suing, and often winning, in court.234
VI. CONCLUSION: INSPIRATION FROM CRIMINAL LAW
In this Article, I have argued that the foundational principles
that justify criminal punishment should form the basis for the
adjudication and sanctioning of students in campus sexual
misconduct proceedings. While the personnel, goals, and available
sanctions are importantly different in the two settings of court and
campus, the two systems of punishment share core values which
should greatly inform the adjudication of sexual assault under
college misconduct codes.
No one suggests that college misconduct boards should employ
the high standard of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—that applies
in criminal cases, and few would insist on the level of procedural
protection (e.g., the right to a publicly funded attorney for indigent

233. See, e.g., Sara Ganim & Nelli Black, An Imperfect Process: How Campuses
Deal
with
Sexual
Assault,
CNN
(Dec.
21,
2015,
4:38
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/22/us/campus-sexual-assault-tribunals/index.html
(discussing procedures at University of California San Diego, where respondents are
allowed to hire lawyers but their lawyers are not permitted to speak during the
proceedings); Allie Grasgreen, Students Lawyer Up, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 26,
2013),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/26/north-carolina-becomesfirst-state-guarantee-students-option-lawyer-disciplinary
(noting
that
most
universities do not allow lawyers to speak on their client’s behalf at disciplinary
proceedings).
234. See, e.g., Jake New, Court Wins for Accused, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (Nov. 15,
2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/05/more-students-punishedover-sexual-assault-are-winning-lawsuits-against-colleges (“Students suspended or
expelled over allegations of sexual assault rarely succeed in lawsuits against the
institutions that punished them. That’s starting to change.”); Jake New, Out of
Balance, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2016/04/14/several-students-win-recent-lawsuits-against-colleges-punished-the
m-sexual-assault (“Colleges lose series of rulings in suits brought by male students
accused of sex assault. In stinging decisions, judges fault lack of due process.”).
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defendants) that criminal defendants receive. But it is too easy to
understate the degree to which a finding of responsibility for sexual
assault can affect the life of a party who is found to be responsible.
As colleges and universities increase the possible sanctions for
sexual misconduct, including expulsion and permanent notations on
the educational records of student violators, we should acknowledge
that harsher penalties place a proportionately heavier burden on
college policymakers to get it right.
It is crucial that colleges treat reports of sexual assault seriously,
that they punish such assaults appropriately, and that they try to
help survivors deal with the emotional trauma of assault, both
during and after the adjudication process. But it is just as important
to assure the accused person of a fair and impartial adjudicatory
proceeding in which he or she has adequate opportunity to
understand the process, absorb and respond to the complainant’s
evidence, and present his or her case to those who will decide
whether or not a code violation took place. A process that is not fair,
or is not perceived to be fair, to both parties cannot serve the
interests of anyone, including the victims of sexual assault. In
deciding their response to the new regulation proposed by the DOE,
colleges and universities should not reflexively defend misconduct
codes that were themselves too hastily assembled in response to
controversial mandates from the government. This time, instead,
they should think more carefully about what fairness means in the
context of adjudicating sexual misconduct charges on campus. The
principles which ground the criminal process are the best place to
start.

